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ABSTRACT
This dissertation targets at studying the cause and implication of empirical grounded in-
dustry facts using multiple methodologies, including analytical model, statistical model, and
agent-based simulation. Basically, this dissertation investigates two main research objects, the
U.S. beef industry and restructured electricity market.
Beef is the single largest sector within United States agricultural production, accounting
for a fifth of farm market revenues.Unlike other animal products, only a small share of output
is produced under vertically integrated arrangements. Beef production also differs from other
sectors because of the long production lags and the opportunity to utilize forage from lower
quality land. The sector divides between grass-based cow-calf operations during the first year
of a beef animal’s life and grain-based feeder operations during the months preceding slaughter.
The two sub-sectors also differ in regards to financial performance. Empirical data shows that
cow-calf sector has strong positive autocorrelation in returns over time while the feeding sector
return is close to white noise. Using the notion of Ricardian rent this study extends existing
dynamic models of beef market equilibrium to rationalize this difference. Time series data are
tested where preliminary tests provide evidence in favor of the theory proposed by this study.
The results are important in explaining why the cattle feeding sector is relatively immune from
demand and supply-side shocks whereas cow-calf operations are more exposed.
The second part of the dissertation turns focus on the restructured electricity market. In
April 2003, the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) proposed a new market
design for U.S. wholesale power markets. Core features of this design include oversight of opera-
tions by some form of Independent System Operator (ISO), a two-settlement system consisting
of a day-ahead market supported by a parallel real-time market to ensure continual balancing
of supply and demand for power, and management of grid congestion by means of locational
marginal pricing. The restructuring of electricity market stays in the layer of wholesale market
xiii
while the retail market still remains highly regulated by the state government. To alleviate
the disconnection between wholesale and retail market, ISO propels demand response program
to encourage retail customers join the wholesale market which is supposed to pass wholesale
market price signal to the final customers. To investigate the impact of this connecting at-
tempt on current power system performance in terms of both market and physical operation,
this dissertation conducts agent-based simulation experiments on three topics that are closely
related with demand response and price-sensitive bidding behavior. Specific studied issues in-
clude: a close-loop simulation study of two-settlement market with price-sensitive customers
and intelligent load serving entity(LSE thereafter), a multi-agent simulation study of demand
response (DR thereafter) provider baseline inflation behavior and generator company(GenCo
thereafter) investment decisions under high penetration level of DR resource with a market
framework requested by new FERC Order 745, an agent-based simulation study of LSE strate-
gic price sensitive bidding behavior under three different market clearing mechanisms. To carry
out this research, a flexible simulation framework is developed independently with a major ex-
tension of the AMES wholesale power market test bed to include two-settlement system, Unit
Commitment system, smart device, intelligent LSE, multi-task ISO and capacity market.
1CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
This dissertation has two major research objects: U.S. beef industry and restructured elec-
tricity industry. Both of the two commodity goods have special properties that distinguish
themselves from other commodities. This dissertation incorporates these distinguishing prop-
erties into analytical or simulation models and draws conclusions leaning on these properties.
Beef production has the longest life span among all the major agricultural products. Usually
it takes up to three years for a new-born calf to finally end up in beef market. This long life
span forms a cycle pattern for the cattle livestock and therefore beef price. The other property
of cattle industry is the limited supply of proper pasture land for the use of cattle breeding
which determines supply of cow herds. On the other hand, cattle feeding is more competitive
since the feeding inputs can be easily purchased from nation wide agricultural product market.
These features give the cattle breeding operators market power to get the Ricardian rent which
results from limited supply of scarce resource.
Electric power has also two distinct features. First, it is extremely expensive, if not impos-
sible, to store power energy. Thus, it must keep a constant balance of supply and demand on
power grid. In traditional power system operation, this balance is guaranteed through adjust-
ing generation resource to satisfy fluctuating load, a concept well known as “load following”.
Second, power flow among transmission paths cannot be freely controlled due to the underlying
physical law of power flow. Increase of power injection at one bus could have significant change
to the power flow on other buses and branches. These two features contribute to the fact that
a centralized control room is needed to monitor and coordinate supply of power on the grid.
Economic Dispatch is a management tool used to dispatch power, result of which containing
2locational marginal price (LMP thereafter) and dispatched generation quantity. Due to the
non-storable property, electricity price has high volatility and are sensitive to real-time load
fluctuation. Due to the physical power flow constraints, some transmission line may reach the
capacity limit when the system achieves the most efficient power dispatch. The inability to
transfer power through the congested transmission line creates price difference not only at the
two ends of the congested line but across the whole power system. Therefore, high degree of
volatility and separation of LMP is a common phenomenon in power market.
Except special natures of the two commodity goods, the two industries also have distinct
market structure. Beef industry has two separated sectors, the upstream cow-calf sector and
the downstream cattle-feeding sector. The two sectors interact through intermediate goods,
calf. While the upstream operators concentrate in a few breeding lot, the downstream is more
open to competition.
Power industry also has two sectors, the transmission level wholesale market and distribu-
tion level retail market. The restructure of power industry mainly refers to that of wholesale
level market. In April 2003 the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC thereafter)
proposed a complicated market design called the Wholesale Power Market Platform (WPMP
thereafter) for common adoption by all U.S. wholesale power markets. In this power market,
Generator Company(GenCo thereafter) and Load Serving Entity(LSE thereafter) are bidding
into a Independent System Operator(ISO thereafter) conducted market. Retail market is still
subject to regulation where fixed price contract is prevalent for retail customers. As blind to
the wholesale price signal, electricity load is known for its inelasticity. Demand inelasticity
and the associated “load following” concept induces GenCo to exercise market power by either
withholding capacity or bidding at high price. The lack of load flexibility also hampers the
adoption of intermittent renewable energy, such as wind and solar. However, the lack of demand
elasticity is a result of market structure flaw rather than the nature of electricity consumption.
As realizing this situation, FERC lists incorporating demand response as one of the three top
initiatives.
The complexity of studying restructured energy market lies in three aspects: the complex
set of market protocols, the must-be-satisfied physical constraints, and the market participants
3strategic behavior. A thorough testing and simulation work is necessary to understand and
evaluate the impact of market rules modification in terms of both economic efficiency and
system reliability. This dissertation utilizes agent-based modeling approach to set up a vir-
tual world that imitates market participants, market environment and the interaction between
them. As the first step to set up agent-based simulation, ISO’s market operation protocols are
carefully examined to ensure that simulation could replicate market operation procedure used
in the real world. Physical constraints and market clearing algorithm are incorporated into
the model which represents the distinct natures of electricity as mentioned above. Meanwhile,
market participants are modeled to seek for the best action for their own interest. Simulation
results are characterized by the emerging system pattern rather than the calculated equilib-
rium. By conducting such agent-based simulation experiments, we can test the potential policy
implication and shed light on the problem resolving method.
1.2 Organization of the Dissertation
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 is devoted to the issue of beef industry return pattern. It starts with a description
of observed different return patterns in the upstream and downstream sector of beef industry.
An analytical model is set up to examine the dynamics of the two sectors return given a
market structure with upstream sector obtaining Ricardian rent. A careful comparison of the
two sectors implied return is conducted to reveal the underlying reasons of different return
patterns. The conclusions implied by the analytical model is then tested using data collected
from different sources. The time series data is cleaned and fit into different statistical model.
The empirical work supports the implications of the analytical model.
Chapter 3 overviews the research background and methodology of the following study on
restructured electricity market. In the U.S., power system has been under restructuring for
more than a decade. Since then, power trading, and investment in this electricity market has
experienced significant changes. Market designers are facing with new problems and challenges
with the process of restructuring. Agent-based model emerges as a powerful tool to study the
electricity market since it pays equal respect to both the physical constraint and market partic-
4ipants behavior. This chapter explains the concept of agent-based modeling and distinguishes
it from other simulation approaches. A thorough literature review shows the wide application
of agent-based modeling in electricity market research.
Chapter 4 summarizes the research work of the project “integrated retail and wholesale
electricity market”, a joint program of Iowa State University and Pacific Northwest National
Lab. The primary objective is to test the market performance with a dynamic pricing retail
contract which passes wholesale market price to the retail customers. The IRW project seams
two independently developed test bed, Agent-based Modeling of Electricity Systems(AMES
thereafter) for transmission level system and GridLab-D for distribution level system. A smart
meter device was designed to balance between utility and cost of electricity use which also
takes into consideration inter-temporal physical constraints. LSE passes day-ahead price to
final customer and settles itself with both day-ahead and real-time price. Intelligent LSE
learns to submit bids that replicates final customer’s price-sensitive behavior to minimize its
loss. Simulation result suggests a robust market performance.
Chapter 5 studies the impact of FERC order 745 which requests ISO to compensate load
curtail by the wholesale market price. This study targets at both the short-term and long-term
effect of FERC order 745. In the short-term, DR providers have incentive to maneuver their
bids to either inflate baseline estimation or enjoy free compensation. In the long-term, DR has
strong incentive to participate into the market due to the double payment which in turn squeeze
away the capacity revenue of conventional generators. Both of the two aspects indicate that
the design of compensation method as requested by FERC order 745 might lead to significant
distortion and cause social efficiency loss.
Chapter 6 turns the focus on LSE price sensitive bidding in day-ahead market. It introduces
the fact that during California crisis, big utility companies avoids bidding into day-ahead market
to lower their total power procurement cost. Convergence of forward market and spot market is
a main concern for the system operator because of the security reason since day-ahead market
collects information to commit units for next-day. To study market participant’s incentive
of strategic bidding, three different market structures are compared. An agent-based model
incorporating unit commitment is used to test LSE strategic bidding behavior under different
5market structures. The study sheds light on the complexity of electricity market which takes
both financial and physical functionalities.
Chapter 7 concludes the whole dissertation. Findings and challenges of each research topic
are summarized to illustrates the contribution of this dissertation to academic literature and
empirical research work.
6CHAPTER 2. RATIONALIZING TIME SERIES DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN COW-CALF AND FEEDER RETURNS
2.1 Introduction
Beef is the single largest sector within United States agricultural production, accounting for
a fifth of farm market revenues. Unlike other animal products, only a small share of output is
produced under vertically integrated arrangements. The industry divides between grass-based
cow-calf operations during the first year of a beef animal’s life and grain-based feeder operations
during the months preceding slaughter. Cow-calf sector, which produces calves that go into
feedlots, is mostly pasture based. The cattle feeding sector purchases the feeder cattle from the
open market, and use corn and other concentrates to finish animals for slaughter. The two sub-
sectors also differ in regards to financial performance. Using data from the Livestock Marketing
Information Center1, Figure 2.1 provides time series of returns for the two sub-sectors. Casual
inspection suggests the former reflects strong positive autocorrelation in returns over time while
the latter may be close to white noise. This difference can be viewed as the motivation for
this paper. Our investigation of the link between the upstream and downstream of cattle
industry will help understand the production decision mechanism. The results are important
in explaining why the cattle feeding sector is relatively immune from demand and supply-side
shocks whereas cow-calf operations are more exposed, a phenomenon well observed in the beef
industry2. It is well known that beef production differs from other sectors because of long
lags in production responses. The beef industry can not respond to a price signal quickly, but
1The Livestock Marketing Information Center (LMIC) is a institute providing economic analysis and market
projections concerning the livestock industry since 1955. Return data used here include annual return data for
cow-calf operation and feeding operation, ranging from 1975 to 2007.
2USDA Economic Research Service has made great contribution to the understanding of different effects of
feed cost on these two sectors. One good example is the research report by Stillman, Harley and Mathews in
2009, which indicates that the cow-calf operation is less affected by the current high feed cost.
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Figure 2.1: Cow/Calf and Feeding Sector’s Return Series
The data used here is provided by LMIC. Both of the two returns are annual data.
rather needs years of time to adjust the breeding stock. Producers make decisions to expand
or contract production before feed and product prices are known. Biological lags mean that
animal products consumed today are based on production decisions made up to 2 years ago.
Cow-calf operators make production decisions by choosing between calf sale for fattening and
retention for breeding, that is a choice between consumption goods and capital goods.
In addition to this dynamic constraint, the cow-calf sector also differs from other production
sector by the scarcity of suitable pasture for the cattle to graze on. The distribution of cow-calf
operation region is illustrated in Figure 2.2. This map groups the cow-calf operation according
to regions based on the survey of Agricultural Resource Management Study (ARMS). By this
survey, cow-calf operators in the west and southern plains have significant cost advantages over
operators in other regions due to the longer grazing season. The two regions account for 50
percent of the production of weaned calves. 3The suitable pasture land for cow-calf operation
is a scarce resource that can not be replicated.
By contrast, the feeding operation does not have such properties. It takes around 160-180
days to finish the fattening process, a much shorter time than the production of feeder cattle.
3See USDA statistical bulletin report number 974-3.
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Except for feeder cattle, the main cost for cattle feeding is corn and other feed grain, which
can be purchased freely on commodity markets. The feeder sector allows free entry and exit.
Based on this fact, we assume the cow-calf sector will obtain the Ricardian rent from beef
sales, be it positive or negative. The Ricardian rent is passed to cow-calf sector through the
price of feeder cattle. Feeder cattle prices are affected by prices paid for fed cattle which, in
turn, are affected by consumer demand for beef as reflected in retail beef prices. At the time of
the feeder cattle transaction, bid for cattle feeder will drive up the feeder cattle until there is
zero expected economic profit. Since the futures market for live cattle is very mature, market
information is available to all the participants who utilize this finance tool to make hedging.
With the assumption of full incidence pass through, we extend existing dynamic models of beef
market equilibrium to rationalize the difference.
A substantial amount of progress have already been made in understanding cattle cycles.
Jarvis (1974) was among the first to point out that a permanent increase of beef price might
reduce the live cattle supply, and hence brought attention to how cattle investment decisions
interact with biological production lags in the cattle cycle. Along the same line, Rucker et al.
9(1984); Foster and Burt (1992); Rosen (1994) developed models to explain how the biological
structure affect cattle supply by treating live cattle both as consumption and capital goods.
Particularly, Rosen (1994) stripped away most of the details and focused on the exogenous
shock’s effect on the formation of cattle cycles. Rosen et al. (1994) (RMS hereafter) extended
this model to a more complete biological structure, and implied clear cyclical pattern for breed-
ing stock and live cattle price.
Heterogenous expectation also attracted scholar’s attention when trying to interpret the
cattle cycle. Both Baak (1999) and Chavas (2000) tested for different forms of bounded expec-
tations and estimated the weights of operators with these expectations. Baak’s study found
that approximately one-third of ranchers appear to have bounded rationality in the sense that
they forecast future prices based solely on time series observations. Chavas found that less
than one-fifth of cattle producers appear to behave consistently with full rational expectations.
But as argued in Aadland (2004), despite of these empirical evidences, rationality in expec-
tation formation is still mostly favored by economist seeking to explain the aggregate cattle
stock behavior. The evidence on heterogenous expectations is not strong enough to reverse
the conclusion made under rational expectation. So, in this study, we adhere to the rational
expectation formation.
So far, most of the literature about cattle cycles does not separate the cow-calf and feeder
sectors in the beef supply chain. One exception is the work by Aadland and BAILEY (2001),
Aadland (2004), Aadland (2005). Aadland distinguished the fed beef price from unfed beef
price, and hence proposed two margin problems for cow-calf operators. Under this framework,
producers will respond positively to relatively higher prices along one margin and will build
up stocks along the other margin. Despite this segregation, the feeder sector was still ignored,
and hence the interaction between the two sectors was not considered.
To investigate this interaction issue, our work employs the idea of Ricardian rent theory
(RRT hereafter). In RRT, rent is defined as “that portion of the produce of the earth, which
is paid to the landlord for the use of the original and indestructible powers of the soil” Ricardo
(1821). Economic theory suggests that extra production profits resulting from high beef prices
will ultimately accrue to the cow-calf operators because breeding stock as well as the suitable
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pasture land is the most limiting resource in beef production. However, the RRT is quite
challenged in the recent study in farmland rent and price. Kirwan () estimates that only 25
percent of the government subsidy will finally flow to the landlord. Du et al. (2007) finds
little support of RRT when examining the crop price increase effect on cropland rent. They
attribute the failure of RRT to the lack of mobility for tenants and inertia in leasing contract
re-negotiations. However, compared with tenants, feeder cattle are easier to transport and the
feeder cattle market is quite liquid, which implies the failure of RRT reasons might not exist
in the cattle industry.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the dynamic rational expectation model
including two sectors, with an explicit form of the two sectors’ return derived. Section 3 tests
the RRT using the live cattle futures price. Also in section 3, we have a formal test of the
return’s pattern, and the implications from the model. Section 4 concludes by summarizing
the main findings of the paper and suggesting avenues for further research.
2.2 Theoretical Model
2.2.1 Background and Main Assumption
This paper clearly builds on the aforementioned work of Rosen (1994) and Aadland and
BAILEY (2001). Before introducing the model setup, it is necessary to formally outline the
environment being modeled. The separation of cattle life is a relatively recent phenomenon.
Prior to the 1930s, feeding of high concentrate grains was rare and most cattle lives on the
pasture or harvested forage for the whole life. Since then, the practice of finishing feeder cattle
on grains has become commonplace and in more recent times (beginning in the 1960s), finishing
has graviated toward organized feedlots.
Within the first six months after the calf is born, there are few decisions to make. After
weaning, a calf is typically six to ten months old. If it is male, the calf will most likely be
castrated and sent to feeding lot later, with only a small portion left for breeding purpose. The
problem for the female calves is complicated since it is a consumption good and also a capital
good. Cow-calf operators need to decide whether to retain the female calf for addition to the
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breeding stock (capital good) or sell them for beef production (consumption good).
The calves for consumption will then be sold as feeder cattle in the open market. They
will first go through the so called finishing process for four to six months. After this stage,
the animal will reach the final stop, the feedlot, where they will be fed high-concentrate grains
for approximately six months to be fattened for slaughter. So, generally there are two main
stages for a typical beef animal’s life. Roughly speaking, a beef cattle will grow up under two
operations, cow-calf operation and feeding operation, with each one accounted for one year
time. On the other branch, breeding cattle will be first bred when they are fifteen months
old. The gestation period will last for nine months. So, it takes around two years for a calf
to give birth to its offspring. Two years is also the age at which a meat animal is ready to be
slaughtered.
A dynamic rational expectation model is set up to capture the essential components in the
beef supply chain. The key to this model is the interaction between the two sectors through
the pricing of feeder cattle. As discussed in the introduction, since breeding cattle sector faces
dynamic constraint, and the suitable pasture land is inelastic as well, we will assume the cow-
calf operation will obtain all the extra profit from beef production. With rational expectations
of all the market participant, the feeder cattle price will be bid up when there is positive
expectation concerning forward beef markets, and will be bid down when the forward beef
markets are depressed.
The model is set in discrete time with decision intervals one year in length. The biology
structure is assumed to be consistent with the reality. The cow-calf operators make decision
when the calf is one year old. The calves reserved for retention will be added into the breeding
stock while the feeder calves will be sold to the feedlot and enter the beef market in the following
year. Because of separation of two sectors, there are two prices, feeder cattle price and beef
price. To make the problem tractable, we assume the breeding cow has the same value before
and after giving the first birth. This setup is different from Aadland and BAILEY (2001) which
distinguished between fed and unfed beef price but ignores calf price. This simplification will
not change the main conclusions of this paper if the fed and unfed beef is highly correlated,
but will provide great convenience for the model setup.
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For the market participants, we assume cow-calf operators to be forward-looking, rational
agents that maximize a discounted expected future stream of profits subject to biological and
market constraints. The feedlot operators have the same rational expectation as cow-calf
operators, but they are take-it-or-leave-it participants that can freely enter and exit the market.
We assume that operators in each type are identical and make decisions in competitive input
and output markets.
Properties of market equilibrium are established by analyzing the activities of a represen-
tative cow-calf operator and a representative feedlot operator. Consistent with other animal
cycle models, the present and future production possibilities are linked by a population dy-
namics constraint, which gives the trade off between current consumption and potential future
consumption. The main difference from Rosen (1994) is that the cow-calf operators now have
to make beef production decisions one year earlier by selling a fixed number of feeder calves to
feedlots one year earlier.
The model is determined by a stochastic difference equation and the shocks come from three
aspects. Two types of shocks originate on the supply side, the holding cost of breeding cattle,
ht, as well the finishing and marketing cost of feeder cattle, mt. The other shock comes from
the demand side, the income level shock yt. As with Rosen (1994), we simplify the model setup
by abstracting from sex and life-cycle aspects of herd management, assuming a homogeneous
female population with a biologically determined constant birth rate.4 Table 2.1 gives the
connection between this model and that of Rosen (1994).
Table 2.1: Connection between this model and Rosen (1987)
Rosen (1987) This Paper
biological structure Not clearly specified Yearling-Cow
market structure one layer competitive market up-stream and down-stream industry
slaughter at period t made at period t decision made at period t-1
shocks coming from demand side, as Rosen (1987)
holding cost and marketing cost
4As noted in Rosen (1994), p 548
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2.3 Dynamic constraints:
Consider a closed economy, the growth of breeding cattle stock xt is determined by two
parts, the addition of total new born calves gxt, and the deletion of sold calves st. So gxt − st
is the net addition of calves, and they will grow to be the breeding stock in the next period.
The feeder calves sold to feedlot will go through finishing and fattening, and end up in beef
market in the next period. This evolution of cattle stock is shown in equation (2.1):
xt+1 = (1 + g)xt − st (2.1)
with x0 given and st ≥ 0, xt ≥ 0 for all time points t ∈ {0,∞}. We can solve equation (2.1) by
forward substitution. From equation (2.1), we can get xt =
st
1+g +
xt+1
1+g .Then forward this result
for one period, we can get xt+1 =
st+1
1+g +
xt+2
1+g . Substitute xt+1 into the expression of xt, we can
get xt =
st
1+g +
st+1
(1+g)2
. Repeat this process, we can get the following complete intertemporal
constraint:
xt =
∞∑
τ=0
st+τ/(1 + g)
τ+1 (2.2)
Also given the available information of period t, take expectation to both side of equation
(2.2) implies:
xt = Et
∞∑
τ=0
(st+τ )/(1 + g)
τ+1 (2.3)
2.3.1 Market Equilibrium
Market equilibrium is achieved through the dynamic decisions made by cow-calf operators
as well as static decision of feedlot operators. Given the feeder cattle price and the rational
expectation, the market supply and demand of feeder cattle must equate. Looking at the
cow-calf operation side, cow-calf operator’s profit per animal is defined as
picct = qtst − htxt+1 (2.4)
where qt is the price of feeder cattle sold to feedlot, and the superscript cc stands for cow-calf.
The cow-calf operator’s return per cattle can be written as:
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Rcct = qt − ht (2.5)
where R is for returns and the superscript is for cow-calf. As assumed, cow-calf operators will
make the reproduction decision, and they will get the Ricardian rent, which drives feedlot’s
expected profit to be zero. At time point t, feedlot operator purchases st feeder calves from
cow-calf operators and sell them to the beef market in period t+1. The feedlot’s return per
cattle can be written as:
Rfdt = (pt+1 −mt+1)/(1 + r)− qt (2.6)
where pt+1 is the fed-cow price in the beef market, mt+1 is the finishing and marketing cost, so
(pt+1−mt+1)/(1+r) is the discounted revenue from one cow, while qt is the cost for purchasing
a yearling. Ricardian rent theory implies that the time t expected return is 0, so from equation
(2.6), we can get:
qt(1 + r) = Et(pt+1 −mt+1) ≡ p∗t+1 −m∗t+1 (2.7)
where Et is the expectation operator at period t, and the notation p
∗
t+1 = Et(pt+1) is used to
be consistent with Rosen (1994). At this stage, it’s necessary to sum the notation used for this
model setup, as shown in Table 2.2. Under this model setup, cow-calf operators will face a
dynamic problem, and maximize the sum of discounted life-time profit:
Vt = Et
∞∑
τ=0
pirt+τ/(1 + r)
τ (2.8)
The solution to this problem is characterized by the Euler Equation that make the cow-calf
operators indifferent between holding and selling, that is:
qt =
1
β
Et(qt+1 − ht+1) (2.9)
whereβ =
1 + r
1 + g
< 1 (2.10)
15
Table 2.2: Notation and Definition
x breeding stock
s the number of yearlings sold to feedlot
q price of yearling
p price of fed cow
m unit cost of finishing incurred by feedlot
y demand shifters
h unit holding cost of yearlings incurred by cow-calf operators
r the market rate of interest
β (1+r)/(1+g),the net discount rate
Rcc cow-calf’s net return for opreatiing cow-calf business
Rfd feeders net return for finishing fed cow
g net birth rate after accounting for natural deaths
picct cow-calf’s net cash flow in period t
Vt capital value of operating the cow-calf business
Et expection operator, given all the information at period t
b the fed cow supplied in beef market
k∗t+τ short for Et(kt+τ )
To get an analytical solution to this problem, we suppose the demand of beef follows a
linear demand function:
bt = α− γpt + yt (2.11)
where in this demand function, bt is the demand for fed cow at period t, pt is the price for fed
cow in beef market, yt is the demand shifter for fed cattle. As assumed, the supply of fed cow
in period t comes from the sold feeder cattle in period t-1, that is, bt = st−1. So we can rewrite
the beef demand function in terms of feeder cattle: st = α − γpt+1 + yt+1.Take expectation
given all the information at time t, we can get:
st = α− γp∗t+1 + y∗t+1 (2.12)
where p∗t+1 ≡ Et(pt+1), y∗t+1 ≡ Et(yt+1) are the expected beef price and demand shifter in year
t+1,which is consistent with Rosen (1994)’s notation. By assumption, the feedlot makes zero
expected profit from finishing operation. Substitute equation (2.7) into equation (2.12), we can
get the sold amount st in terms of yearling’s price qt:
st = α+ y
∗
t+1 − γ[qt(1 + r) +m∗t+1] (2.13)
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Using the law of expectations, equation (2.13) can be rewritten as:
s∗t+τ = α+ y
∗
t+τ+1 − γ[q∗t+τ (1 + r) +m∗t+τ+1] (2.14)
With the same approach, we can rewrite the Euler equation (2.9) as:
q∗t+τ = β(q
∗
t+τ+1 + h
∗
t+τ+1) (2.15)
where the price of q at the beginning is given. Solve this by forward substitution, q∗t+τ =
βq∗t+τ−1 + βh∗t+τ−1 = β2(q∗t+τ−2 + h∗t+τ−2) + βh∗t+τ−1.Repeating this process, we can get the
expected future feeder cattle price in terms of current yearling price and expected holding cost.
As shown in equation(2.16), it pins down the optimal path for cow-calf operator.
q∗t+τ = β
τqt +
τ∑
i=1
βτh∗t+τ−i (2.16)
Collecting equations, the competitive market equilibrium is described by equation (2.16),
(2.14) and the intertemporal budget constraint(2.3).
2.3.2 Solving the model
To illustrate the recursive property of the model, it’s convenient to express the vari-
ables in the deviation form. Equation (2.17) expresses the shocks in such a form, where the
bar expressions are ”normal” values and ujt ’s are deviation from normal.
yt = y + u
y
t ,mt = m+ u
m
t , ht = h+ u
h
t (2.17)
Following this, define the capital notation as the deviations from the normal level:
Xt = xt − x, St = st − s,Qt = qt − q (2.18)
With this deviation form, we can rewrite equation (2.18) as follow:5
5Please refer to Appendix A
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Xt = − γ(1 + r)
1 + g − βQt +
∞∑
τ=0
v∗t+τ/(1 + g)
τ+1 (2.19)
Qt =
1 + g − β
γ(1 + r)
[−Xt +
∞∑
τ=0
v∗t+τ/(1 + g)
τ+1] (2.20)
St = (1 + g − β)Xt − (1 + g − β)
∞∑
τ=0
v∗t+τ/(1 + g)
τ+1 + uy∗t+1 − γum∗t+1
Xt+1 = βXt + (1 + g − β)
∞∑
τ=0
v∗t+τ/(1 + g)
τ+1 − uy∗t+1 + γum∗t+1
wherev∗t+τ = u
y∗
t+τ+1 − γum∗t+τ+1 −
(1 + r)γβu∗t+τ
1 + g − β
Notice that, compare with Rosen (1994)6, the difference is that the effect of demand shifter
y and feedlot’s feeding cost m comes from time t + 1, while the effect of cow-calf operator’s
holding cost is the same. This difference comes from the assumption change that yearling’s
price is determined by the expected beef price in next year. Assume that all the shocks evolves
as serially correlated processes with parameter ρj :
uyt+1 = ρyu
y
t + ε
y
t+1 (2.21)
umt+1 = ρmu
m
t + ε
m
t+1
uht+1 = ρhu
h
t + ε
h
t+1
where the ε’s are pure noise. This implies uj∗t+τ = ρτju
j
t , substitute into equation(2.19),
7we
can get:
Qt =
1 + g − β
γ(1 + r)
[−Xt + ρy
1 + g − ρy u
y
t −
γρm
1 + g − ρmu
m
t ]−
β
1 + g − ρhu
h
t (2.22)
St = (1 + g − β)Xt + ρy(β − ρy)
1 + g − ρy u
y
t − γ
ρm(β − ρm)
1 + g − ρm u
m
t +
βγ(1 + r)
1 + g − ρhu
h
t (2.23)
Xt+1 = βXt − ρy(β − ρy)
1 + g − ρy u
y
t + γ
ρm(β − ρm)
1 + g − ρm u
m
t −
βγ(1 + r)
1 + g − ρhu
h
t (2.24)
6the counterpart can be found in the Appendix D.
7Please refer to Appendix B
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Compare this solution with Rosen (1994)8, we can see the main difference is that the effect
of shock uyt and u
m
t is weakened through multiplying by ρj , while the effect of shock u
h
t is
magnified through multiplying by (1+r). The reason in the first change lies in the structure of
uyt+1 and u
m
t+1. With these equations, we can back out the path for the profits which are of our
interest.
2.3.3 Result
In this subsection, we will derive the main conclusions of the model. Under the assumption
of Ricardian rent incidence on cow-calf operator, feedlot will earn a zero expected profit. It’s
easy to see the realized return of feedlot is random, and there is no recursive property. Sub-
stituting equation (2.7) into equation (2.13), we can get qt =
1
1+r (
α+y∗t+1−st
γ −m∗t+1). Inserting
this into the return function of feedlot (2.6), we can get:
Rfdt =
1
1 + r
(
α+ yt+1 − st
γ
−mt+1)− (2.25)
1
1 + r
(
α+ y∗t+1 − st
γ
−m∗t+1)
=
εyt+1/γ − εmt+1
1 + r
As both εyt+1 and ε
m
t+1 are pure random variables, the profit for feedlot is also a random
variable. Also, the expectation of this return is 0. This is the first conclusion of this paper:
Proposition 1. The realized return of feedlot is random and only affected by the shock from
demand shifter side and finishing feed cost.
Then look at the returns of cow-calf operator. Follow equation (2.5), we can rewrite the
returns of cow-calf operators in deviation form:
Rcct = Qt − uht (2.26)
=
1 + g − β
γ(1 + r)
[−Xt + ρy
1 + g − ρy u
y
t −
γρm
1 + g − ρmu
m
t ]−
1 + g + β − ρh
1 + g − ρh u
h
t
8the counterpart can be found in the Appendix D
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As Xt has recursive property as shown in equation (2.24), the return of cow-calf operator’s
profit also has recursive property. Also, notice that, if the correlation ρj is small, which means
the shock is temporary, the effect from demand shifter and finishing cost can be very small,
while the effect from holding cost can’t be negligible.
To make this paint more clearly, we can solve the explicit form of cow-calf operator return.9
. The recursive form for Rrt can be written as
Rcct+1 = βR
cc
t + λu
h
t + Ψt+1 (2.27)
where λ = (1+g+β−ρh)(1+g−ρh) (β − ρh) +
β(1+g−β)
1+g−ρh , Ψt+1 =
1+g−β
γ(1+r) [
ρy
1+g−ρy ε
y
t+1 − γρm1+g−ρm εmt+1] −
(1+g+β−ρh)
1+g−ρh ε
h
t+1
Equation (2.27) confirms our observations of returns of cow-calf operators, and this is our
second proposition:
Proposition 2. The return of cow-calf operation has first-order positive autocorrelation
Examine this clear form of cow-calf operator’s return, we can get two corollaries:
Corollary 1. The deviation level of beef demand shifter and finishing feed cost does not affect
the cow-calf operator’s return in next period.
This is not a surprising result following previous assumptions. As the Euler equation (2.9)
states, the price for selling the yearlings this period should equal the expected payoff from
holding these yearlings and selling the new yearlings in next period’s market. Rewrite the
Euler equation in the return form, we can get:
Rcct + u
h
t =
1
β
Et(R
cc
t+1) (2.28)
So we can see that the demand shifter and finishing cost has dropped out from the optimal
path for cow-calf operator’s return. The effect of two shocks on cow-calf operation only comes
from the unexpected random term, as in Ψt+1. So, the cow-calf operation’s return is largely
shielded from the price fluctuation of the two shocks.
9Please refer to Appendix C
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This result comes from the rational expectation assumption. The three shocks have auto-
correlation structure as defined in (2.21). So, at the time when feeder cattle is set the part
of shocks ut+1 coming from the correlation with current shock ρµt has already been expected.
This feeder cattle’s price, in turn, is reflected in time t’s return Rcct . So, current shock’s level
µt will have no influence on the return structure when Rt is also present.
Corollary 2. The effect of holding cost on the return pattern can go either way, which is
determined by the difference by β − ρh.
From the definition of λ in equation (2.27), we can see the magnitude of λ depends on the
sign of β − ρh. If β > ρh,then λ > 0, and a high level of holding cost deviation from normal
level in this period can bring a high level of cow-calf operation’s return. If β < ρh, λ can be
a small positive number or even negative, which means the high holding cost induces a low
cow-calf operation’s return in next period. Particularly if β = ρh, λ is degenerated to β, the
net discount rate.
This result is also intuitive as can be seen from return form of Euler equation (2.28). If
the holding cost is very high in the current period, it is optimal to get a higher return in next
period in order to compensate this high cost. If the next period’s expected return is not high
enough, cow-calf operators will sell more of feeder cattle at this time point, which will cut the
supply capability in next period. This cut in supply in the next period will drive the expected
return of cow-calf operation up in the next period. This compensation effect is captured by the
net discount rate β. On the other hand, if the autocorrelation of holding cost is large, a high
holding cost this period means a good chance for high holding cost in the next period. So it is
likely that the cow-calf operators realized returns will be small due to the high cost of feed or
forage cost.
2.4 Empirical Work
The work in this section is in three folds. The first one is to test Ricardian rent theory,
the base of this model. The second one tests the causal observation of different return pattern.
The third one examines the implication from the theoretical work.
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2.4.1 Ricardian Rent Theory Test
The model is largely based on the assumption that the Ricardian rent is passed to the Cow-
calf operators through the price of feeder cattle. If Ricardian theory is correct, then the increase
of market expectation for fattened cattle would bid up spot feeder cattle prices. The first data
source is Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), which provides daily data of live cattle(lc) and
feeder cattle(fc). The second data source is National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS)
under United States Department of Agriculture. Data found from NASS includes the monthly
data of corn’s price, feed grain and hay index, Consumer Price Index. All the data are reported
regularly in NASS’s monthly agricultural report. The time span of all the data goes from Jan
1979 to Feb. 2009. Altogether there are 362 samples for monthly data and 30 samples for
annual data. Daily data are transformed to be monthly data by taking an arithmetic average.
So, for the live cattle and feeder cattle futures, monthly data are used.
We need to further transform the available data to fit the purpose. Firstly of the test, we
use the nearest maturing cattle feeder future price to substitute cattle feeder’s spot price P fdt ,
ignoring the basis between the two prices. Secondly, assume the farmers could use live cattle’s
futures price to lock in a certain price when the cattle is ready for slaughter. As reported by
Iowa Beef Center, it typically takes 6 or 7 months for a calf to grow up to a steer. As the
CME live cattle futures contracts are only settled in even months (like February, April and so
on), we suppose in even month it takes 6 months for finishing while in odd months it takes 7
months so that when the fed cattle is mature there is a corresponding price. By this rule, we
can get a series of live cattle future prices F lct,t+s, the one matured when cattle are fattened.
Here the upper script lc stands for live cattle while s is the time needs to fatten cattle. Thirdly,
we use the monthly corn price to represent the cost for feeding. As reported by USDA10, 90
percent of feeding cost comes from corn. A preliminary test confirms that soybean price has
no significant effect in feeder cattle’s price.
By the futures specifications of CME in 2009, the feeder cattle midpoint weight is 749.5
pounds while it is 1262.5 pounds for live cattle. So, we need to transform the ”per animal
expression” of RRT in equation (2.7) to the per pound expression. The corresponding regression
10Please refer to the report by Stillman, Haley, and Mathews in 2009.
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Table 2.3: Unit root Test statistics for corn, live cattle and feeder cattle
feeder cattle future qt Live cattle future F
lc
t,t+1 Corn P
cn
t
Single Mean Case
ADF -1.71 -1.60 -3.38**
P-P -1.98 -1.80 -2.64*
KPSS 1.23*** 1.26*** 0.17
Trend Case
ADF -3.71** -2.82 -3.38*
P-P -2.78 -2.71 -2.70
KPSS 0.23*** 0.27*** 0.15**
Notice: the statistics for ADF, P P and KPSS are t, adj-t and adj-LM respectively,
* rejects the hypothosis at 10% level,
** rejects the hypothosis at 5% level,
*** rejects the hypothosis at 1% leve
is shown in as follow:
P fdt = β0 + β1F
lc
t,t+1 + β2P
cn
t + εt where εt ∼ N(0, σ2) (2.29)
Let the half year discount rate to 5%, and take into account the death rate of feeder calves
as 1.2%11, then RRT implies β1 =
1262.5
(1+0.012)(1+0.05)∗749.5 = 1.58. The estimate of the coefficient
β1 will indicate the proportion of Ricardian rent passed to the cow-calf operator.
As summarized in Wang and Tomek (2007), the unit root is a common problem in the
commodity price, especially the nominal price. Also, different unit root test approaches do not
agree in many cases. To establish that the regression is not spurious, we subject the data to
a detailed unit root test, and the results are listed in Table 2.8. Notice that, the hypothesis
for ADF and P-P methods is the existence of unit root while the hypothesis for KPSS is that
the time series is stationary. The test result shows there is strong evidence that the variables
have unit root problem and are not stationary time series. Despite of this news, we could do
the cointegration test to test whether the linear combination of these variables are stationary.
Table 2.4 gives positive information with all the three variables having significant evidence of
cointegration. So, the three variables have inherent correlation, and the regression result will
not be spurious.
111.2% is the mean level of death rate in feeding process as reported by Food Link.
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Table 2.4: Cointegration tests for corn, live cattle and feeder cattle
Trace Test Maximum Eigenvalue Test
No. of CE(s) trace stat Prob Max-Eig stat Prob
None 55.6 0.000 31.8 0.001
At most 1 23.8 0.002 19.6 0.006
At most 2 4.2 0.039 4.2 0.039
Notice: the test result is obtained using Eviews 5
(a) ACF (b) PACF
Figure 2.3: ACF and PACF for the OLS residual
Using OLS to estimate (2.29) could give us a flavor of how the model works. Figure 2.5
presents the ACF and PACF of the OLS residual. From this ACF figure, we can see there
is strong seasonal effect with a seasonal lag of 12 months. This seasonal effect is commonly
observed in agricultural commodities, which is largely affected by the weather and timing. The
PACF figure suggests that the residual has strong AR(1) correlation, as the PACF cuts off from
lag 1. This result is consistent with the theoretical work. Since the feeder cattle is the main
revenue source for cow-calf operations, the cow-calf return’s AR(1) structure implies the feeder
cattle price may also have AR(1) structure. To specify the model correctly, we need to remove
the seasonal and AR(1) correlation from the residual. A two step FGLS method is employed
to remove this correlation. In the first step,we run the SARMA model over the OLS residual,
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Table 2.5: FGLS estimate of coefficients in regression (2.29
Coefficient β0 β1 β2
Estimate -0.004 1.35*** -6.43***
Std. err 0.59 0.04 0.51
P value 0.993 0.000 0.000
Adj R2 0.75 D-W stat 2.05
Notice: the test result is obtained using Eviews 5
with the SARMA structure shown as follow:
(1− Φ1L12)(1− θ1L)ωt = εt
With the coefficient estimates Φ̂1 and θ̂1, we can transform the regressors in equation (2.29) .
The new regressors yt is defined as yt = (1−Φ̂1L12)(1−θ̂1L)xt, where xt is the original regressor.
Then run OLS over this new regressors to get the estimate of β. Referring to Greene(2007),
there is no gain by iterating this process. As can be seen in Table 2.5, the D-W test is close
2, implying that the residual has no correlation problem. Figure 2.4 compares OLS and FGLS
residual diagnosis, it is clear that FGLS approach has removed the residual correlation problem
from OLS estimation.
(a) OLS (b) FGLS
Figure 2.4: Comparsion of OLS and FGLS residual diagnosis a
aThe diagnosis is done using R 2.8.2
Table 2.5 lists the estimate for β using FGLS. Especially, the estimate for β1 is 1.35, and
the 5% level confidence interval for β1 is [1.25,1.45]. Compared with the ideal value of 1.58,
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Table 2.6: Mean zero test result
Sample mean -10.01
Sample std.dev 60.52
t-statistic -0.95
P-value 0.34
the estimate value of 1.35 suggests that 85.4% of the increase of future live cattle’s price will
transfer to the current feeder cattle. The confidence level for this estimate ranges from 78.1% to
90.6%. In another word, about 85.4% of the Ricardian rent is passed to the cow-calf operation.
Compared with the 25% pass through ratio in the crop subsidy, 85.4% is significantly large.
This indicates that the Ricardian rent incidence on cow-calf operators is a plausible assumption.
2.4.2 Different Return Patterns for Cow-calf And Feeding Sectors
Feedlot Return
This subsection will seek to verify the casual observation from figure 1 that feedlot have
random return while cow-calf operations have positive autocorrelation. This is also the main
conclusion of our model.
The RRT implies that the feeding lot should have zero expected profit. If the market partic-
ipants have rational expectation, the realized return should be consistent with this expectation,
that is, the realized return has a zero mean. The t-test result in Table 2.6 indicates that we
can’t reject the zero mean hypothesis of feeding sector’s return. So, the feeding sector does not
earn a significant positive profit over the last thirty years.
If the market forms rational expectations, the realized return to feedlot should be pure
white noise, without any correlation pattern. A complete correlogram can illustrate this test
result well, which is summarized in Table 2.7. For the lags up to 10, there is no autocorrelation
or partial autocorrelation is significantly different from 0, and the corresponding p-values fail
to reject the null hypothesis. So, we can say feeding sector’s return is just a series of random
variable, without clue to show any correlation.
Cow-calf Return
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Table 2.7: Corrlogram of feeding sector’s return
Lag Autocorrelation Partial Autocorrelation P-values
1 0.039 0.039 0.812
2 0.021 0.019 0.964
3 0.065 0.064 0.971
4 -0.001 -0.006 0.994
5 0.030 0.028 0.998
6 0.116 0.110 0.991
7 0.029 0.021 0.996
8 0.059 0.051 0.998
9 0.079 0.063 0.998
10 0.139 0.134 0.993
As talked before, the cow-calf sector should have positively correlated returns. We can test
this property by fitting an ARMA structure to the data. Before running any regression, we
need to make sure this time series is stationary. A test for unit root in cow-calf return is listed
in Table 2.8. It shows that the unit root hypothesis is rejected at a 5% level for both of the
two test methods. So, it is safe to run a regression over the undifferenced data.
Table 2.8: Unit root test for cow-calf return
Test Method ADF test PP test
Test Statistics -2.187 -2.255
p value 0.029 0.025
1% Critical Value* -2.637 -2.636
5% Critical Value -1.952 -1.951
10% Critical Value -1.621 -1.611
As shown in the model, cow-calf sector’s return has first order positive autocorrelation. We
will use several models to fit the data, and test the AR(1) coefficient respectively. Suppose the
most general model has the following form, with βi as the AR(i) coefficient and γi as the MA(i)
coefficient:
R1t = β0c+ β1R
1
t−1 + β2R
1
t−2 + β3R
1
t−3 + γ1εt−1 + εt (2.30)
The test result is summarized in Table 2.9 with several criterion listed to compare the perfor-
mance of these models.
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Table 2.9: Comparison performance of different models (2.29)
AR(1) AR(2) AR(3) ARMA(1,1) ARMA(2,1)
β0 5.24(7.98) 7.05(7.75) 7.81(8.21) 16.42(27.61) 18.71(19.59)
β1 0.74**(0.11) 0.95**(0.17) 0.91**(0.19) 0.64**(0.17) 1.14*(0.43)
β2 NA -0.31(0.17) -0.24(0.26) NA -0.46(0.33)
β3 NA NA -0.07(0.20) NA NA
γ1 NA NA NA 0.29(0.22) -0.23(0.48)
F-test 40.18** 21.48** 11.89** 21.92** 14.03**
AIC 10.53 10.46 10.55 10.52 10.51
S-C 10.62 10.60 10.73 10.65 10.70
D-W 1.53 2.05 1.98 1.92 1.98
* significant at 10% level
** significant at 5% level
(a) AR(1) (b) AR(2)
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(c) AR(3) (d) ARMA(2,1)
Figure 2.5: ACF and PACF for the OLS residual
Firstly, notice that β1 is the only parameter that is significant through different models.
This strongly suggests that the first order correlation is significant, which is consistent with
the theoretical analysis. Secondly, both the AIC and S-C criterion shows that AR(2) model
best fits the data. Also, the S-C criterion suggests that AR(1) model is the second best model
to fit the data. But the D-W test indicates that the residual term of AR(1) model still has
some correlation not explained by the model. Another approach to compare the performance
of different model is to look at the AC and PAC graphs, which are listed in Figure 2.5. The
pattern of AC and PAC also suggest that a higher order of autocorrelation term is preferable
than the AR(1) model. In a word, the data suggest that cow-calf sector’s returns have strong
first order correlation, but higher order correlation is still possible. And it helps to explain the
data better.
So, this section’s empirical work verifies the casual observation about the different return
pattern. It also provides strong support for the theoretical model.
29
2.4.3 Calibration and Test of Model Implication
This section will calibrate the parameters used in the model, which, in turn, will confirm
the model setup.
Cattle Holding Cost Correlation
The data used to calibrate cow-calf sector’s holding cost correlation comes from USDA
Economic research service (http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data). Among the listed cost items, only
the total feeding cost is consistently surveyed from 1982 to 2007. So, we are going to use this
total feeding cost as a substitute of the cattle holding cost. Including time trend, we can get a
AR(1) estimation as follow12.
ht = 61.54
(24.37∗∗∗)
+ 0.45
(0.19∗∗)
ht−1 + 11.67
(1.48∗∗∗)
t+ εt
Cattle Feeding Cost Correlation
As we have talked before, the main grain used for feeding cattle is corn. We can use the
historical corn price as a candidate to estimate cattle feeding cost correlation. The data used
here come from USDA NASS agricultural price report, covering annual data from 1949 to 1999.
Also including time trend, we can get an estimation as follow:
ft = 0.0094
(0.0023∗∗∗)
+ 0.48
(0.10∗∗∗)
ft−1 − 0.001
(0.000∗∗)
t+ εt
Demand Shifter Correlation
Different from the previous two cost variables, the demand shifter can not be observed
directly. Instead, we will employ the FGLS approach to estimate the correlation of demand
shifter. Follow equation (2.11), if the demand shifter yt has AR(1) correlation structure, then
the regression of equation (2.11) will have serial correlation problem. Using the two steps
FGLS, we will run the OLS regression first, and then run the AR(1) auxiliary regression to
the OLS residual in the last step. This auxiliary regression will have asymptotically efficient
estimate of the demand shifter correlation ρy, and there is no gain to iterate the two steps. So,
we will use the estimator of the auxiliary regression as the estimate for ρy.
12The numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors of estimates, this expression will be used for the rest of
this section.
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The data we employ includes annual steer whole sale value and annual steer slaughter
quantity, covering from 1970 to 2005. The data can also be found in USDA Economic research
service. (http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/). Run OLS to estimate demand function, and then
fit residuals into AR(1) model.
bt = 208.2
∗∗∗
3.49
− 0.21∗∗∗
0.02
pt + yt
withyt = 0.16
∗
0.10
yt−1 + εt
Other Parameter
Chavas (1999) estimates the expected birth rate for calf as 1, which means that the breeding
cow will give birth to one calf. The mean death rate is 0.08, which is also reported in his work.
Then, we can get a net birth rate to be g = 1 − 0.08 = 0.92. Take the annual discount rate r
as constant 10%, we can get an estimate of β = 1+0.11+0.92 = 0.58. In sum, the calibration for the
parameters used in the model is listed in Table 2.10.
Table 2.10: Calibration of parameter value
Parameter ρh ρf ρd β
Estimate 0.45 0.48 0.16 0.58
Ste err 0.19 0.10 0.1
Test of Corollary 1
The theoretical model shows that cow-calf operation return only relies on the maintain cost
of breeding stock, but it is not directly related with the feeding cost or demand shifter. We
collected corn’s price, which is the main feeding cost, to test this inference. Based on previous
work, we will use both AR(1) and AR(2) model to test corn’s effect on the cow-calf sector’s
return, which are presented in the two equations of (2.31) respectively.
R1t = β1R
1
t−1 + αCt + εt (2.31)
R1t = β1R
1
t−1 + β2R
1
t−2 + αCt + εt
So, the hypothesis to test is:
H0 : α = 0
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H1 : otherwise The test result is summarized in Table 2.11. It indicates that in both
models, the corn price effect is not significant. The AIC and S-C criterions are not better but
worse off over the original models. Also, the corn’s price does not explain the residual term’s
correlation in AR(1) model, which is reflected in the D-W test. So we can conclude that the
corn price, which is a indicator of feeding cost, does not affect cow/calf sector’s return.
Table 2.11: Test of corn’s effect on cow-calf operation return
Model AR(1) AR(2)
α -25.223(23.62) -11.60(25.88)
Result Can’t reject Can’t reject
AIC 10.53 10.52
S-C 10.62 10.70
D-W 1.53 2.02
2.5 Conclusion
This paper seeks to explain the differences in return patterns of the upstream and down-
stream operators in the beef supply chain. Under the assumption that the Ricardian rent
incidence is on the cow-calf operators, we set up a rational expectation dynamic model to in-
vestigate the interaction between cow-calf operators and feeding operators. The model shows
that the cow-calf operators, who make production decision, will get positively correlated returns
to maximize the whole life profit. With free entry and exit, the feeding operators can not affect
the production decisions, and end up with pure random returns, which are only affected by
random shocks. The model also suggests that feeding operation provides a cushion for cow-calf
operators from the demand shifter and finishing feed cost. The empirical study shows that
85.4% of the Ricardian rent will go through to the upstream sector, giving strong support to
the model’s validity. The key parameters are calibrated through real world data, which also
adds credit to the model specification. We believe it is the first time in literature to explicitly
discuss the relationship between the two sectors of beef industry under the dynamic rational
expectation framework.
We have four remarks about future possible extensions to the present study. Firstly, the
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empirical study suggest that there is an AR(2) component in the cow-calf operator returns.
This AR(2) structure can give rise to the cow-calf return cycles, which can not be explained
by the current theoretical work. This requires to extend the model to a more complete biology
structure, such as that of RMS (1994). Secondly, in addition to the calf retention decisions,
cow-calf operators also need to make cull decisions of breeding cow. But our model did not
distinguish fed beef price from unfed beef price, so we can not analyze this double decisions
problem explicitly. Aadland (2001) has shown there will be a different effect from the classic
conclusion as in RMS (1994) when considering this price differences. Thirdly, compare the
integrated industry and two-layer industry, we can find that the main difference is that the cow-
calf operators have to make production decisions one year earlier. In the integrated industry,
the operators can delay to make the feeding decisions until there is more clear information
about market demand or feeding cost. So, one can investigate whether this real option value
is significant to justify the integration of the two sectors. Fourthly, the beef industry was
affected by exogenous shocks, for example, Oprah Winfrey’s comment about mad beef disease
caused beef price plummet in 1996 although this effect disappeared quickly. By the setting
of this model, such unexpected and uncorrelated shocks will affect the of down-stream sector
profit but have little impact on the up-stream sector. Such case study on the different effects
can be done in the future.
33
CHAPTER 3. ELECTRIC POWER MARKETS: HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGICAL TOOLS
3.1 Overview of Electricity Market Restructuring
3.1.1 Electricity Market Restructuring and Current Status
As the 21st century begins, the United States, like many other industrialized nations, is
in the midst of a revolution in the electricity business. An industry dominated by monopoly
utility companies, regulated from top to bottom by the states and the federal government, is
seeing competition and deregulation in the generation and sale of electric power. As mentioned
in Brennan et al. (2001), promoting competition has become associated with rules, regulations,
institutions, and in some cases divestitures designed to ensure that the power markets operate
efficiently and competitively. For that reason, the process of enacting and implementing laws
and policies to bring more competition to electric power markets has come to be known as
restructuring.
The propelling forces for market restructuring comes from high electricity price as a result
of bad stranded investment decisions where suppliers could get guaranteed rate of return. As
pointed out by Borenstein and Bushnell (2000), in a market-based environment, firms that
do not have the security of a guaranteed rate of return on their investments will be more
prudent in their capital expenditures and the way they manage risk. The promise of electricity
restructuring is that a competitive market in power will lead to a more efficient electricity
industry. Opening markets to competition generally gives firms better incentives to control
costs, introduce innovations, and seek new ways to serve consumers. Competition will also
allow those savings to be passed on to consumers. But ensuring that markets achieve their
goals requires attention to make sure that competition works well where it can, and that
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price regulation promotes efficiency where monopoly is inevitable. In this sense, electricity
restructuring is far different from deregulation. One example for regulation in the restructured
electricity market is the price caps which is necessary due to the lack of significant scale of
real-time responsiveness demand.
In the U.S., the electricity restructuring is promoted and managed by FERC. In 1996,
FERC issued Orders 888 and 889 to guide the formation of ISOs. In 2003, FERC published the
White Paper Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (2003) for common adoption by North
American wholesale power markets, referred to below as the Wholesale Power Market Platform
(WPMP). The White Paper recommends standards for market design which contains several
core features:central oversight by an independent system operator (ISO); a two-settlement
system consisting of a day-ahead market supported by a parallel real-time market to ensure
continual balancing of supply and demand for power; and management of grid congestion
by means of locational marginal pricing (LMP). As depicted in Fig 3.1,versions of the WPMP
design have been implemented (or adopted for implementation) in energy regions encompassing
over 50% of U.S. generating capacity. These energy regions include the Midwest (MISO), New
England (ISONE), New York (NYISO), the Mid-Atlantic States (PJM), California (CAISO),
the Southwest (SPP), and Texas (ERCOT).
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Figure 3.1: North American energy regions that have adopted FERCs wholesale power market
design
Source: FERC Market Oversight
3.1.2 Market Operation
A typical timeline for the wholesale market operation is shown in Figure 3.2, as summarized
by Botterud and Wang (2010). The procedures and timeline are based on the current rules
in the MISO market. However, other markets are operated in a similar way, following FERC
recommended market operation standard. The main steps in the market operations, includ-
ing determination of reserve requirements, day-ahead (DA) operations, reliability-assessment
commitment(RAC), and real-time (RT) operations.
In a typical day D, LSEs and GenCos bid into the day-ahead market before 11 am. ISO
collects and evaluates all the bids and offers. ISO then runs security constrained unit com-
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mitment(SCUC) to solve for the unit commitment decisions for operation day D+1. Unit
commitment is a plan decision that can not be changed in the real-time operation because
generation units can not be instantly turned on. Because of this limited ramping rate, ISO
needs to ramp generation units before the operation hour to keep enough resource on line to
serve load and meet reserve requirement. Given the unit commitment decisions are made, ISO
runs security constrained economic dispatch (SCED) to solve for the shadow price of transmis-
sion line capacity, locational marginal price of local bus, cleared price-sensitive demand of LSE
bids, cleared power output of GenCo offers. Since the whole procedure solves both the binary
unit commitment variables and continuous power dispatch variables, this problem is known as
mixed-integer-programming(MIP). The cleared price and quantity are then posted used for DA
market settlement.
What follows day-ahead unit commitment(DA UC) is the reliability assessment commitment
process. The RAC process provides input into the operation of the Real-Time Energy and
Operating Reserve Market to ensure that sufficient Resources are available and on-line to meet
the demand and Operating Reserve requirements within the Market Footprint.The RAC process
also employs a SCUC algorithm to minimize the cost of committing the required capacity to
meet forecasted demand. The difference between RAC and DA UC is that DA UC is based
on the demand bids of LSE but RAC relies on the load forecast provided by load balance
authority (LBA). In a word, the market participant settles their cost and revenue through the
result of DA market, but the actual unit commitment and production follows the order of RAC.
Because LSEs do not have the right incentive to bid all their load to the day-ahead market,
ISO needs to make load forecast to guarantee there are sufficient generation resource on-line.
By doing that, ISO separates the financial hedging function and physical scheduling
function.
When it goes to real-time operation in day D+1, ISO has few things to do with changing unit
commitment which is a plan decision made in day-ahead operation. ISO clears real-time market
using SCED every 5 minutes and post the ex-post price for RT market settlement. Another
difference between DA and RT market is that in DA market, LSE submits price-sensitive bids
which reflects demand elasticity. In the RT market, ISO only dispatch generation resource to
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serve the realized power consumption, which has no demand elasticity.
After day D+1, market are settled using both the DA and RT market information. LSE
is charged for the cleared demand at day-ahead price and load deviation at real-time price.
GenCo are settled in the same way. The extra cost incurred due to difference between DA
UC and RAC decisions are settled out of the market, which usually takes the form of uplift
payment.
Figure 3.2: Market Operation Line for MISO
3.1.3 Electric Choice
ERCOT is chosen as our empirical benchmark for modeling retail competition because
ERCOT has moved further than any other U.S. energy region towards the integrated restruc-
turing of its retail and wholesale power market operations, as stated in Kiesling and Kleit
(2009). Moreover, ERCOT is vigorously pursuing implementation of smart grid initiatives
such as smart metering. For example, in December 2009 ERCOT launched a new system of
wholesale settlement for its advanced metered customers based on their 15-minute electricity
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usage ERC (2009).
One important theme of electricity market reform in ERCOT has been the divestment of
traditional utility operations. Specifically, Chapter 25 of the Public Utility Commission of
Texas (PUCT) now requires that each electric utility shall separate its business activities and
related costs into separate units handling generation, transmission, and distribution. 1
The result has been that retail competition in ERCOT is now realized through the separa-
tion of physical power flows from the financial contracting for power purchases and sales. As
depicted in Fig. 3.3, power flow operations are managed by Transmission and/or Distribution
Utilities (TDUs) whereas financial contracts are provided by LSEs.
Figure 3.3: IRW Power System Test Bed: AMES & GridLAB-D
1 more details can be found in PUC () operation manual.
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More precisely, LSEs purchase bulk power from the wholesale market and resell it to retail
customers through various financial contracts. LSEs are not responsible for infrastructure con-
struction and maintenance, but compete for retail customers. Customers can switch financial
contracts or LSEs without power usage interference.
Fig. 3.4 depicts the entities involved in ERCOT electric retail operation in greater detail.
LSEs represent either Competitive Retailers (CRs), which are the only organizations authorized
to sell electricity to retail customers who have customer choice, or Non Opt-In Entities (NOIEs),
which are represented by wholesale delivery points. LSEs forecast their customer load and
negotiate privately with other market participants, such as power marketers, to buy energy.
The CRs in ERCOT are further subdivided into Retail Electric Providers (REPs) and Opt-
In Entities (OIEs). Entry barriers for REPs in ERCOT are quite low. As reported in PUC
(2009), by June 2008, 85 REPs were providing electric service to customers. These REPs were
offering as many as 96 different products in various territories, including 13 REPs which were
offering, between them, 23 different renewable energy options.
Figure 3.4: Retail Entities in ERCOT
Electric service switching can be done smoothly with this business separation structure. CRs
interact directly with ERCOT when submitting switching requests, where customers choose a
new CR. ERCOT processes the switching requests by working with TDUs to obtain the initial
and final meter reads, confirming switches with customers, and confirming the switch with the
relevant CRs once the switch is approved. The rules for REP operation are evolving to deal
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with the ripple effect of REP’s bankruptcy. For example, ERCOT is currently in the process
of finalizing its REP rules on disclosure and billing terms.
Various types of customer service contracts flourish in ERCOT’s retail market. Indeed,
ERCOT provides over 96 different types of contracts for its retail customers. These contracts
are primarily differentiated in terms of the type of rate structure that is offered to meet different
customer needs. For example, customers can choose among fixed-rate (FR) contracts, time-of-
use (TOU) contracts, and real-time-pricing (RTP) contracts.
3.2 Overview of Agent-Based Computational Model
3.2.1 Introduction of Agent-Based Model
Before goes to the detail of agent-based model, it is useful to look at a example of agent-
based model(ABM). The study in Schelling (1971) is a good illustration of agent-based mod-
eling. Household modeled in this experiment chooses to move when they observe there is not
enough surrounding neighbors with the same color as them. When simulation reaches a stop-
ping point, where households no longer wish to move, there is always a pattern of clusters of
adjacent households of the same color. Figure 3.5 shows this pattern of clusters compared with
the demographics distribution. This experiment mimics the behavior of household, and the
emerging pattern could be used to explain the observed segregation.
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(a) Actual (b) Simulated
Figure 3.5: Comparison of Actual Demographics and Simulated Result
As a general form of this example, agent-based model represents complex system that con-
sists of interacting, autonomous components. A complex adaptive system has the additional
capability for agents to adapt at the individual or population levels. Investigations into com-
plex systems could be used to identify universal principles and emergent phenomenons of such
systems. Following Macal and M.J. (2010), a typical agent-based model has three components:
1. A set of agents, their attributes and behaviors.
2. A set of agent relationships and methods of interaction: An underlying topology of con-
nectedness defines how and with whom agents interact.
3. The agents environment: Agents interact with their environment in addition to other
agents.
A typical agent structure is illustrated in Figure 3.6. In an agent-based model, everything
associated with an agent is either an agent attribute or an agent method that operates on the
agent.
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Figure 3.6: Typical Agent
3.2.2 Analytical Model v.s. Agent-Based Model
Like other mathematically intensive sciences, economics is becoming increasingly computer-
ized. Despite the extent of the computation, however, there is very little true simulation. Simple
computation is a form of theory articulation, whereas agent-based simulation is analogous to
an experimental procedure. In another word, computation mimics the mathematical model
while agent-based simulation mimics the true economic process. The computer has been seen
as a legitimate tool in economics only when traditional analytical solutions cannot be derived.
But agent-based simulation is usually shun by economist because the “bottom-up” approach
cannot link the assumption and conclusions, while the traditional mathematical model could
improve economic understanding by analytical deriving from a set of fundamental economic
axioms. (Lehtinen and Kuorikoski (2007))
Although saying that, agent-based model has some attractive properties that could help
economists to understand economic process. LeBaron et al. (1999) conducts an agent-based
simulation of a simple financial market that produces interesting results that have proved to
be hard to derive from an analytical equilibrium model. LeBaron et al. (1999) first derive
analytically a general form of linear rational expectations equilibrium under the assumption of
homogeneity of risk aversion and normal prices and dividends. The homogeneity assumption
allows the use of a representative agent, which makes the analytical solution possible. An
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agent-based simulation experiment is conducted to mimic stock trading behavior and system
dynamics. The main simulation result is that if learning is slow, the resulting long run behavior
of the market is similar to the rational expectations equilibrium benchmark. If the learning is
fast, the market does not settle into any stable equilibrium, but exhibits many of the puzzling
empirical features of real markets. The result highlights how important market phenomena
can crucially depend on features such as learning dynamics and heterogeneity, which make the
situation difficult or impossible to model analytically.
The simplicity and analytical tractability of equilibrium models nearly always rest on as-
sumptions that are known to be highly unrealistic (perfect rationality and different kinds of
homogeneity). The computation ability of agent-based modeling could help alleviate strong as-
sumption and models some distinct features of the research object. It may not be appropriate
to completely substitute analytical model with agent-based simulation, but the latter could be
used as complement tools to test, validate analytical model or explain puzzles that analytical
model cannot answer. Agent-based model is especially useful for the study of complex system
with heterogenous agents and non-linear interactions among agents.
3.2.3 Application of Agent-Based Model in Electricity Market Research
Electricity market has been one of the most fertile grounds for agent-based simulation,
mostly because electricity market research involves complicated market protocols, physical
constraints, market inefficiencies and therefore potential market power. Agent-based model
appears to be a strong research tools to study the dynamics of the market with the capability
of dealing with high non-linear interactions and heterogeneous market participants.In recent
years, more and more researchers have developed different kinds of agent-based models to
simulate electricity markets. In Weidlich and Veit (2008), and Zhou et al. (2007), surveys
about agent-based simulation of wholesale electricity markets give a lot insights of agent-based
modeling application. In Zhou, Z. , Chan,W. and Chow, J. (2007), there are four agent-based
electricity market simulation tools are mentioned:
1. Simulator for electric power industry agents (SEPIA), is developed by Honeywell Tech-
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nology Center and the University of Minnesota. Generation companies, consumers and
transmission operator are modeled as agents. Generation company agents can use both a
Q-learning module and a genetic classifier learning module to make decisions. As one of
the earliest agent-based simulator for power markets, it is a good example. And it con-
tains two learning methods. But it lacks ISO agent, and has some practical limitations
of model, both restrict its usage.
2. Electricity market complex adaptive systems (EMCAS), is developed by center for energy,
environmental and economic systems analysis at the Argonne national lab. Generation
companies (GenCos), transmission companies operators (ISOs) or regional transmission
organizations (RTOs), demand companies (DemCos), consumers, and regula12 tors are
modeled as agents. An EMCAS simulation runs over six decision levels, ranging from
hourly dispatching to long-term planning. At each decision level, agents make certain
decisions, including determining electricity consumption (customer agents), unit commit-
ment (generation companies), bilateral contracting (generation and demand companies),
and unit dispatch (ISO/RTO agent). EMCAS is used by regulatory institutions inter-
ested in market design and consumer impact issues, transmission companies and market
operators interested in system and market performance, and generation companies for
strategic company issues.
3. Short-term electricity market simulator-real time (STEMS-RT), is developed by Electric
Power Research Institute (EPRI). STEMS-RT has features: agents rely on mathematical
programming for bidding decisions and the latest techniques and strategies for bidding
and realistic market rules can be added and their effects can be tested.
4. National electricity market simulation system (NEMSIM), is developed particularly for
the Australia National Electricity Market (NEM). Interestingly, the latest NEM model
is a modified and extended version of the Agent-Based Modeling of Electricity System
(AMES) model.
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3.2.4 Learning Algorithm
Learning algorithm plays a key rule in modeling adaptive agent. With certain learning
ability, agent could learn from past experience and pick the best action for his own interest.
Learning algorithm can be as simple as a sentence of code to define a rule of thumb. It can
also be complicated as genetic learning which is a learn to learn process that can generate
new learning method along the process. With these learning algorithms, versatile agents can
be created to replicate the learning behavior of real economic process. The emergent sys-
tem pattern resulted from agents with learning ability is more meaningful to capture the real
world situation since humans are believed to continuously adjust his own action to adapt to
the changing environment. The ignorance of individual participant’s adaptiveness may cause
misleading theory.For example, Lucas Critique states that macroeconomic theory should have
solid microfoundation since individual decision maker could change its behavior when the pol-
icy changes and that will, in turn, change the economic structure. The theory that ignores this
adaptiveness relies heavily on the historical data and will not be able to make good forecast
within a changed economic environment. In this sense, agent-based model, by modeling micro-
level adaptive decision maker, helps economist to understand the economic structure change
and make better predict of a policy experiment.
As summarized in Li (2009), a key aspect of learning for agents is the amount of informa-
tion (look-back,look-current, and look-ahead) that agents employ. The general learning process
can be expressed as: at beginning, an agent is at a state in a general environment. When a
stimulus occurs, the agent reacts to this stimulus by choosing a particular action (response).
The agent then observes an outcome, and it uses this outcome to either weaken or strengthen
the association between the state and the action in the future. Many different kinds of learn-
ing algorithms have been developed to focus on the information that will be used to update
agent’s belief. Li (2009) enumerates five widely used learning algorithm in the field of artificial
intelligence(AI), including Reinforcement Learning, Stochastic Reactive Roth-Erev Algorithm,
Q-Learning, Genetic Algorithm. The distinguishing features of each learning algorithm is the
amount of information that one agent utilizes to strengthen or weaken the association between
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state and action choice probability.
The other important concept of learning algorithm is the definition of state. Depending
on this criteria, the learning algorithm can be categorized as stateless, exogenous-state, and
rival-action-state learning. Some of the reinforcement learning algorithms are stateless learning
which means that agent can not distinguish the environment that he is living in. Agent takes
every game round as the same, and only updates its belief of the value of a specific action.
Q-learning, as a special form of reinforcement learning, takes exogenous environment vari-
able as the state. As summarized by Yu (2007), Q-learning allows agents to learn how to act in
a controlled Markovian domain with unknown transition functions. The environment is Marko-
vian in the sense that state transition probabilities from state x to state y only depends on x ,
y and the action a taken by the agent, and not on other historical information. The learning
works by successively updating the belief of the value of a state-action pair, Q(x, a), which is
known as the Q-value. This Q-value is the expected discounted reward for taking action a at
state x and the following optimal decision rule thereafter. It is proved in Watkins (1989) that
once these estimated converged to the correct Q-values, the optimal action in any states is the
one with the highest Q-value.
Fictitious-play is another kind of learning algorithm which is firstly introduced by Brown
(1951). The fictitious play differs from Q-learning in that it takes the opponent’s strategy,
instead of exogenous environment variable, as the state. The target for a fictitious player is
to find the best strategy at each state. In it, each player presumes that her/his opponents
are playing stationary (or possibly mixed) strategies. At each round, each player thus best
responds to the empirical frequency of play of his opponent. The opponent’s strategy may be
conditioned on the fictitious player’s last move. If at any time period all the players play a
Nash equilibrium, then they will do so for all subsequent rounds. Berger (2007) also points
out that the original idea of fictitious play is for players to update strategies alternatingly.
Berger (2007) then uses original form of Brown (1951) to present a simple and intuitive proof
of convergence in the case of nondegenerate ordinal potential games.
Both the Q-learning and fictitious-play are implemented in the simulation framework. The
detailed description of these two learning algorithms realization can be found in the following
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chapters.
3.2.5 Brief Overview of the Simulation Framework
To fulfill the task of investigating demand response impact on power market, a simulation
framework is independently developed in the environment of Matlab. This simulation frame-
work inherits and extends the function of AMES test bed (Li (2009)) and includes stub function
that mimics the function of another test bed GridLAB-D 2. This framework extends AMES to
include two-settlement wholesale market, unit commitment process, demand response bidding,
state-based learning algorithm, price responsive smart meter. This framework contains mod-
ules of ISO, PowerGrid, ClearHouse, GenCo, LSE, Load, Learning, and DRProvider. A brief
description of each modules function is provided below.
3.2.5.1 Module of ISO
The module ISO is set up following MISO business practice manual. The market process
follows the one described in section 3.1.2. In each day, ISO runs two-settlement market simul-
taneously. For the day-ahead-market, ISO collects 24 consecutive hourly day-ahead bids and
offers from module of LSE and GenCo respectively. ISO then calls the function of day-ahead
market in the module of ClearHouse. Depending on the needs, ISO can clear the market using
either single DCOPF algorithm or combined Unit Commitment and DCOPF algorithm. After
the market is cleared, ISO publishes cleared price and quantity result. For the real-time mar-
ket, to reduce the computation load, real-time market is cleared every hour, instead of ever 5
minutes as used in the real-time market operation. Differently from day-ahead market, ISO
uses the real-time load generated from the module Load rather than the load bids submitted
by module LSE. Day-ahead supply offers are rolled over to the real-time market, i.e., day-
ahead and real-time market have the same supply offers. After collect all the real-time market
information, ISO calls the function of realtime-market in the module of ClearHouse. In the
real-time-market function, there is only one DCOPF algorithm. After the market is cleared,
all the cleared result will be published.
2details of which can be found in chapter 3
48
Different from AMES, the market settlement process is made by the module of ISO instead
of GenCo. After the two markets are cleared, the hourly cleared price and quantity are public
information to all the agents. Using this data, ISO calculates and posts the actual payments
paid by LSE and compensation received by GenCo.
Another task of ISO is to incorporate Demand Response into daily market operation. ISO
takes the price-sensitive offers from moduleDRProvider and add that data into ClearHouse.
As an institutional requirement, ISO needs to calculate a threshold price that forms the price
floor of DR bids. To fulfill this task, ISO collects all the supply offers from module GenCo, and
form an aggregated supply function. Aggregated supply function is then fit into exponential
function and the threshold price is then calculated using Net-Benefit criteria. 3
3.2.5.2 Module of PowerGrid
Throughout the simulation, it is assumed that the power grid topology does not change.
Given the location of generation bus, load bus and branch reactance, powerflow on the transmis-
sion grid is then calculated using the DC approximation, which is known as state estimation.
The algorithm employed in the module PowerGrid is swing-bus-free, which means that the
powerflow calculation does not rely on the assumption of a specific swing bus. A detailed
description of this algorithm can be found in the Appendix.
The benchmark power grid is a 5-bus transmission grid with branch reactances, locations
of LSEs and GenCos, and initial hour-0 LSE fixed demand levels adopted from Lally (2002).
The true parameter values of LSE load profile, GenCo supply function, and transmission grid
reactances can be found in table B.1 of Li (2009).
3.2.5.3 Module of ClearHouse
The module ClearHouse is used to clear the market by maximizing social benefit subject
to physical constraints. The social benefit contains three parts, supplier surplus, consumer
surplus, and ISO surplus. ClearHouse contains three functions, day-ahead-market, real-time-
market and unit-commitment. The first two functions employ the built-in solver “quadprog”
3Details of DR bids can be found in Chapter 5
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to solve the quadratic DC Optimal Power Flow problem. The last one calls a commercial solver
“CPLEX” to solve the Mixed Integer Programming problem. 4
3.2.5.4 Module of GenCo
The module GenCo mimics generator company behavior in the power market. Everyday,
GenCo submits supply offers to ISO and receive the cleared information from ISO after the
market is cleared. Supply offer has three parts, marginal supply function, generation capacity
limit and ramping cost. The marginal supply function is formulated as
MCi(pGi) = ai + 2bipGi($/MWh) (3.1)
which is defined over an operating capacity interval of
CapLi ≤ pGi ≤ CapUi (3.2)
The inter-temporal ramping cost is formulated as
RCupi,t = c
up (3.3)
RCdni,t = c
dn (3.4)
where RCupi,t is the ramping up cost and RC
dn
i,t is the ramping down cost. Throughout this
dissertation, it is supposed that GenCo submitted DA offers will roll over to the RT market,i.e.,
supply functions in DA and RT market are the same. But due to the load forecast error, GenCo
RT actual generated power pRT∗Gi can be different from DA dispatched amount p
DA∗
Gi . The net
earning of GenCo for supply power in day D+1 hour H is:
NEi(H,D) = LMP
DA
k(i) ∗ pDA∗Gi + LMPRTki ∗ pRT∗Gi − V Cost(pRT∗Gi )($/h) (3.5)
where V Cost(pRT∗gi ) is the variable cost which can be avoided in the daily operation. The
unavoided cost, also known as sunk cost, can be compensated from daily net earning.
4Details of DCOPF can be found in the appendix and the description of Unit Commitment can be found in
chapter 6
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3.2.5.5 Module of LSE
Following the market rules, LSE only participates in the DA market. For each day D, the
demand bid reported by LSE j for each hour H of the day-ahead market in day D+ 1 consists
of a fixed demand bid pFLj(H) and a price-sensitive demand bid function:
DjH(p
S
Lj) = cj(H)− 2dj(H)pSLj(H)($/MWh) (3.6)
defined over a purchase capacity interval
0 ≤ pSLj(H) ≤ SLMaxj(H)(MW ) (3.7)
where pLj denotes the bids of real power for LSE j. LSE could have learning ability in terms
of choosing different combinations of {cj , dj , SLMaxj}.
3.2.5.6 Module of Load
The module Load is designed to generate real-time load. It has two modes for the user to
choose from.
• passive mode.
In this mode, real-time load is set the same as the sum of day-ahead fixed load pFLj and
cleared price-sensitive load:
pRT∗Lj (H) = p
F
Lj + p
S∗
Lj (3.8)
This mode can be used to compare the clearing result of DA and RT market.
• smart-meter mode.
This mode models the load equipped with smart meter device that can make optimized
power consumption decisions that balance between cost and utility of electricity con-
sumption. 5.
5Details can be found in chapter 4
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3.2.5.7 Module of Learning
There are two learning methods adopted in the learning module. Other modules, such as
LSE and DRProvider, are allowed to call this module. By doing that, we can model adaptive
intelligent agents that could learn from the past experience.
• Q Learning.
Q-Learning which is one kind of reinforce learning algorithm that depends on the observed
state. Agents with Q-Learning ability are allowed to choose the action that maximize its
own objective function, either net earning or utility. This learning module updates the
value belief of the {state, action} pair chosen in a experiment cycle. 6
• Fictitious-Play.
Fictitious-Play is different from reinforce learning in that it takes the opponent’s action,
instead of the observed environment variable, as state variable. A sequential Fictitious-
Play algorithm is implemented which means that one agent picks the action that maximize
its objective function given all other opponents’ action unchanged. The system will reach
an equilibrium when no one has the intention to change action. 7
3.2.5.8 Module of DRProvider
The module DRProvider models the behavior of DR providers that participate in the whole-
sale market. Module DRProvider has similar bidding functionality as module LSE. The bids
of LSE also contain two parts, the fixed demand and price-sensitive demand, as defined in
equation 3.6. Different from LSE, DRProvider could control the real-time consumption, which
mainly refers to the real-time load curtail. In this sense, DRProvider is a combination of mod-
ule LSE and Load.
To run a simulation, not all the modules are needed. For example, the simplest simulation
could only involve the module ISO, LSE,GenCo, and ClearHouse, with one-settlement system.
6Details can be found in chapter 4
7Details can be found in chapter 6
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This framework is also flexible to add new modules or functions depending on the research
purpose. The following three chapters conduct three specific experiment on this framework,
emphasizing on different aspect of demand response program.
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CHAPTER 4. SIMULATION RESULTS for TWO SETTLEMENT
ELECTRIC POWER MARKETS WITH DYNAMIC-PRICING
CONTRACTS
THE increasing demand for energy along with growing environmental concerns have created
the need for a modern power grid with the capacity to integrate the renewable energy resources
at large scale. In this paradigm shift, demand response and dynamic pricing are often advocated
as means of mitigating the uncertainty of the renewables and improving the systems efficiency
with respect to economic and environmental metrics. Studies, like Li and Tesfatsion (009a),
argues that generators have strong incentive to exercise market power by withholding capacity
or increasing supply offers when facing a low demand elasticity. The potential benefit of
introducing more flexible retail contracts has been examined by Borenstein et al. (2002). They
argue in favor of real-time pricing, characterized by passing a price, that best reflects the
wholesale prices, to the end customers. They conclude that real-time pricing delivers the most
benefit in the sense of reducing the peak and flattening the load curve.
There are also extensive literatures that compare dynamic pricing with the fixed-price con-
tract which is still the most dominant form of retail electricity contract. Borenstein and Holland
(2005) claims that fixed-price contract not only lead to the prices and investment that are not
first-best, it even fails to achieve the constrained second-best optimum. They also argue that
the increase of RTP customer proportion will hurt the existing RTP customer’s benefit. Joskow
and Tirole (2006) pushes this argument forward by analyzing different scenarios depending on
the advanced metering availability and LSE retail contract tariff. A more diversified conclusions
regarding the efficiency loss of different scenarios are drawn from this analysis.
However, this real-time, price-based coupling between supply and demand creates new
challenges. Firstly, the bill risk is transferred from LSE to the final customer, who pays the
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volatile wholesale market price now. A customer with RTP contract could find itself consuming
a large quantity of power on the day that prices skyrocket, resulting in a high monthly bill.
Borenstein (2006) measured this risk using empirical industrial customer data and claimed
this risk can be mostly hedged off through simple forward contract. The other problem of
potential large-scale RTP customer is the information asymmetry between the customers and
the system operators. Indeed, real-time pricing under information asymmetry leads to increased
uncertainty due to the uncertainty in consumer behavior, preferences, private valuation for
electricity, and consequently, unpredictable reactions to real-time prices. The high penetration
level of RTP customer may increase the load volatility and hurt power grid operation if these
uncertainties can not be fully removed. Roozbehani et al. (2011) give a mathematical prove
that the system will be stable when the demand elasticity of price is lower than the supply
elasticity given the assumption that retail customer take a stationary price forecast method.
In this study, both the problems of risk transfer and system volatility will be carefully
examined. The simulation model is set up using the simulation framework as discussed in
chapter 3. Most of the previous studies only look at the open-loop problem, either only the
effect of RTP on retail customer’s behavior or only the effect of load responsiveness on system
operation. This study will bring the two pieces of a ring together and make a close-loop study.
Particularly, the model simulates how the load customers equipped with smart meter re-
sponse to the ex-ante, or day-ahead price. LSEs respond to final load customers’ action and
bid into wholesale market. LSE behaves for its best profit by collecting information from past
bidding record and corresponding payoff. The model finally close the loop by forming a new
price for the next day and passing it to the load customers. The mode for passing ex-post
price to final customers is also examined using a simplified load and network model. Both of
the simulations designed to pass ex-ante and ex-post price illustrate the system dynamics that
agents interact with the environment signal and other agents.
4.1 Overview of the Integration of Retail and Wholesale Project
As argued in the general introduction chapter, restructured power market is a complicated
research object that involves the issue of power engineering, law, economics and IT commu-
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nication. the complexity of the market characteristics suggest the need for an integrated re-
structuring of both retail and wholesale power markets. Rather than use actual systems as test
beds, however, we are developing an agent-based test bed that seams together two previously
developed agent-based test beds:
• AMES IA2 (2011), an open-source software platform developed by a team of researchers
at Iowa State University for the study of strategic trading in ISO-operated restructured
wholesale power markets with congestion managed by LMP.
• GridLAB-D PNL (2011), an open-source software platform developed by the U.S. De-
partment of Energy at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) for the study of
power distribution systems for end-use customers with power loads arising from a variety
of modeled appliances and equipment.
The task of the IRW project includes the following:
1. Extension of AMES to include a fully operational two-settlement system (real-time and
day-ahead markets)
2. Development of the IRW Power System Test Bed: Seaming of AMES (wholesale) and
GridLAB-D (retail) test beds
3. Development of an initial test case: A household resident with an intelligent HVAC system
4. Modeling and implementation Load Forecast Function to LSE
5. Design and running of experiments to study IRW system performance under alternative
household electricity contracts
6. Development of an experimental lab set-up and an analytical model of distributed pho-
tovoltaic (PV) generation for IRW power system analysis
7. IRW system impacts of reactive power support by distributed PV generation
8. Preparation of IRW Power System Test Bed for open source release
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All these itemized tasks aim at preparing a test bed that is capable of testing the effect of
bringing on-line the price-responsive load customers with the assistance of smart grid technol-
ogy. The first test case is developed using the seamed test bed as illustrated in Fig(4.1). In this
test case, wholesale market has the same setup as that in AMES, details of which can be found
in Li and Tesfatsion (2009). The difference from AMES setup is that LSE has more empirical
grounded load information. As shown in Fig(4.1), each LSE serves households whose power
consumption behavior is extensively modeled in the GridLab-D. The interface of the two test
bed is developed in MySQL. The communication between the two test beds include physical
power flow, price series, and real-time load meter information.
Figure 4.1: Overview of the IRW Project
There are two key questions in seaming the two test beds. The first one being asked is
how load customers respond to the dynamic pricing, i.e., what is the best response of load
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customers to maximize its utility. The second question is what is LSE best strategy to bid into
wholesale market. Keep in mind, day-ahead market is cleared using LSE’s demand bid while
real-time market is cleared using load customer’s actual load consumption. The following two
sections are dedicated to answer these two questions in order to finish the puzzle of seaming.
4.2 Smart Meter Design
This section tries to design a smart meter that can control the work sequence of HVAC, on
behalf of final customers, to maximize final customer’s net surplus. After setting customer’s
preference parameters, the smart meter will be able to automatically control HVAC responding
to the dynamic price. This smart meter does not need to change the function mechanism of
HVAC but only make a little modification for the run-time control. This convenient character-
istic makes it cheaper and easier to be widely adopted.
4.2.1 Model Setup
Suppose the state equations defining the change in the average inside temperature of home
h over periods 1 through T take the following form: For each t = 1, . . . , T ,
mht = St(et, wt,m
h
t−1) , (4.1)
where the initial average inside home temperature from “period 0” is exogenously given at the
beginning of period 1:
mh0 = m
h
0 . (4.2)
Suppose the total cost accessed on the home h resident in period t by the LSE, conditional on
a given energy usage, price, and contract type, is given by the following function:
Ct(et,LMPtk, R
h) = [LMPtket + τtet + Ft] (4.3)
Let the instantaneous utility attained by the home h resident during period t, conditional on a
given home temperature, energy usage, price, and retail contract, be measured by a function
ut defined as follows:
ut(m
h
t , et,LMPtk, R
h) =
[
vt(m
h
t )− αtCt(et,LMPtk, Rh)
]
(4.4)
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Let the total utility attained by the home h resident over periods 1 through T , conditional
on a given home temperature vector mh, energy usage vector e, price vector p, and retail
contract Rh, be measured by a function UT defined as follows:
UT (m
h, e,p, Rh) = ΣTt=1
[
ut(m
h
t , et,LMPtk, R
h)βt
]
(4.5)
Let the expected value of (4.5), conditional on (4.1) and (4.2), be denoted by
E
[
UT (m
h, e,p, Rh)
]
=
∫
W
[
UT (m
h,p, e, Rh)
]
f(w)dw (4.6)
Putting this all together, now consider the following optimization problem:
max
e
E
[
UT (m
h, e,p, Rh)
]
(4.7)
subject to
mht = St(et, wt,m
h
t−1) , t = 1, . . . , T ; (4.8)
mh0 = m
h
0 . (4.9)
Let
Ah = (u, β, T,Rh) (4.10)
denote an attribute vector consisting of the home h resident’s vector u of instantaneous utility
functions ut(·), time-preference discount factor β, planning horizon T , and contract type Rh.
Then any solution to this expected utility maximization problem will have the following form:
For each t = 1, . . . , T ,
e
opt
t = G
opt
t (p,m
h
0 , f(·),Ah) (4.11)
How can a smart meter be constructively designed to generate a sequence of HVAC energy
usages that satisfactorily approximate the optimal solution (4.11) for the home h resident?
Suppose the comfort function vt(·) for the home h resident in each period t is the same
for all t and can be approximated by a concave continuous piecewise-linear “tent function”
v(·) whose graph in the temp-u plane consists of an upward slopping line segment L1 and a
downward sloping line segment L2 that meet at a kink point corresponding to the home h
resident’s most preferred temperature setting, BestTemph. Let vMax ≡ v(BestTemph). Also,
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suppose the slope of L1 is a > 0 and the slope of L2 is −b < 0 for each period t. Finally,
suppose the opportunity cost measures αt for the home h resident take on a constant value α
for each period t. Then the home h attribute vector (4.10) can be approximated by
Xh = (a, b,BestTemph, vMax, α, β, T,Rh) (4.12)
The ”only” remaining task is then to design the smart meter to generate a satisfactory
approximation to (4.11) having the following form: For each t = 1, . . . , T ,
e∗t = G
∗
t (p,m
h
0 , f(·),Xh) (4.13)
4.2.2 Numerical Solution and Implementation
As discussed in the above, the smart meter design problem will be a stochastic dynamic
problem with finite time horizon. This finite time horizon dynamic problem can be solved by
backward induction. Backward induction divides a multi-period optimization problem into a
sequence of one-time period optimization problem, which greatly reduces computation load.
There are two crucial steps in the backward induction method, the last period optimization
and Bellman equation. In the specific smart meter design problem, the last period optimization
problem is given as follow:
V0(m
h
T−1, ωT , pT )
= max
eT
[vT (m
h
T )− αTCT (eT , LMPTk, Rh)]
= max
eT
[vT (ST (eT , ωT ,m
h
T−1))− αTCT (eT , pT )]
(4.14)
where V0 is the value function with 0 period to go. The state transition function (4.1) can be
retrieved from equation (1) and (2) in the ETP model. Notice that the current problem is only
a planning problem, and it assumes that the smart meter could control power usage at time
t. Therefore, we can drop other equations in ETP model which capture the air conditioner’s
power control function. Instead, the heat flux created by air conditioner is express as follow:
QHV AC,T = 3.413 · COP · eT (4.15)
Then, the solution of last period’s optimization problem is featured by the first-order condition
v′T (m
h
T ) · S′T (eT ) = αT · pT (4.16)
60
where pT is the retail price charged on final customers. Equation (4.16) states that in the
optimal condition, benefit of cooling house temperature is equal with the associated cost. At
the last hour of a day, the smart meter will not pay respect to the inter-temporal problem.
The Bellman equation captures the inter-temporal relationship. For example, with one
period to go the Bellman equation has the form as:
V1(m
h
T−2, ωT−1, pT−1)
= max
eT−1
[uT−1(mhT−1, eT−1, pT−1)+
β
∫
ωT
V0(mT−1, ωT , pT )dQ(ωT , ωT−1)]
(4.17)
The first order condition for equation(4.17) is as follow:
v′T−1(m
h
T−1) · S′T−1(eT−1)
=αT−1 · pT−1 + V ′0(mhT−1) · S′T (mhT−1) · S′T−1(eT−1)
(4.18)
Compare the optimal condition for Bellman Equation (4.18) with optimal condition for
the last period problem (4.16), we can see that the marginal benefit of extra energy con-
sumption should be equal with the marginal cost as well as the effect on next period’s value
function. Solving equation (4.17) enables us to obtain the explicit form of policy function
e∗T−1(mT−2, ωT−1, V0, Q) and the value function V1(m
h
T−2, ωT−1, pT−1). Iterating this process
and we can get a solution for the smart meter’s dynamic problem, which is featured by a series
of policy function with the form of equation (4.13).
Notice that, this planning problem may be viewed as the best solution with the assumption
that the smart meter could control directly the electric power of air conditioner. The granularity
of each period must be small enough so that the concept of energy consumption et in this
model could approximate the power concept in ETP model which is based on continuous time.
The small time step will increase computation work to solve this dynamic problem. Also,
this planning method does not pay respect to traditional air conditioner’s functionality. Air
conditioner works under bang-bang control mechanism, which means that energy consumption
is automatically determined after the thermal stat is set. This control mechanism is reflected
in equations (3),(4), and (5) in the ETP model.
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There is an easy way to incorporate ETP model’s result into smart meter’s dynamic problem
and cohere to the function of thermal stat. This method assumes that smart meter receives
price signal, outdoor temperature distribution, current indoor temperature, and combines those
data with consumer’s preference parameters to solve optimization problem and calculate the
optimal setting points. After the thermal stat is set to these optimal points, the following work
will be handed over to the traditional air conditioner.
To make this method work easily, it assumes that the setting points are the temperature
that consumers care about. That is to say, the setting points are the variable mT we used in
the above dynamic problem model. If the indoor temperature is mainly controlled by the air
conditioner, the setting point will be a good approximation of the average indoor temperature.
Under the situation when eT = 0, the indoor temperature changes slowly and the setting
point may not be a good approximation of indoor temperature. In the implementation, we can
correct this error by comparing the final temperature at each period with the setting point. If
there is a big difference, we will say this temperature setting is infeasible, and mark the energy
consumption to be infinite, which will exclude this archer from the dynamic problem.
Given this assumption, the model is greatly simplified. Firstly, if we assume the outdoor
temperature does not change within one hour, then the model granularity is as long as one hour.
This is because the final customer will receive a price signal at each hour. Within each hour, the
state variables do not change. So, the computation work is largely reduced. Secondly, we can
use the simulation result from ETP model directly. Given the two setting points in adjacent
hours,mtandmt+1, ETP model could calculate the energy consumption et. This is the right
information we need to solve this dynamic problem. Thirdly, this method will rely on current
air conditioner functionality and does not require further work to rebuild air conditioner.
4.3 Wholesale Market Design
This section illustrates the wholesale market design. The experiment continues to rely on
the 5-bus test as used in Ames, as shown in Fig(4.2). Although simple the five bus net work
could represent many outstanding characteristic of meshed power grid, such as the transmission
line congestion, generator capacity limit, power flow path. So, this network is widely adopted by
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the researchers to conduct experiments on the power market issues. The detailed information
of the parameter settings, including generator location, generator cost, branch reactance, can
be found in the table [B.1] of Li (2009).
Figure 4.2: Grid Topology
The load profile is a little different from that used in AMES 5-bus test case. In this study,
the HVAC energy consumption profile is firstly generated before smart meter is installed. A
portion of fixed load is replaced by the fixed HVAC energy consumption while this part of load
is allowed to respond to varying price. The load profile and LMP, known as benchmark case,
is illustrated in Fig(4.3).
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Figure 4.3: Benchmark Outcomes: LMP and Fixed Load Profiles for Traditional HVAC Case
4.4 Smart Meter Control and LSE Operation
In this section, we will test the function smart meter as being installed on the HVAC so
that it can respond to the day-ahead price. The loop will not be close until next section. The
HVAC with smart meter is responding to the LMP as shown in Figure(4.3). Figure(4.4) shows
the result of the dynamic programming control. There are five scenarios shown on this graph,
where the first three is the energy consumption of a smart HVAC to respond to the three load
bus LMPs respectively. The fourth one is a fictitious case for HVAC to respond to a flat-price of
30 $/MWh. The last one is energy consumption when the consumer only fix the temperature
setting at 70 degrees without considering the opportunity cost of using this energy. From this
figure, it is clear that with the assistance of smart meter, users use less energy at the peak hour
when the cost to cool down the building is high.
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Figure 4.4: Energy Consumption under Dynamic Pricing
Figure(4.5) shows the control of indoor temperature as compared with outdoor temperature
under the flat price of 30 $/MWh. As shown in the above, the indoor temperature reflect the
control sequence as a result of the optimal energy consumption decisions. From this figure,
it is clear that consumers are willing to sacrifice some comfort at the hours when outdoor
temperature is very high. Figure (4.6) compares the indoor temperature control sequence
under different LMP. This figure shows that when customers under the cheapest price is the
last one to increase the indoor temperature and the indoor temperature only stays in the upper
bound when the lmp reaches peak at hour 18.
Figure 4.5: Room Temperature
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Figure 4.6: Indoor Temperature Control
We will turn the focus on LSE’s behavior when facing price responsive smart HVAC load.
Firstly, we close the loop by assuming that LSE does not forecast the price-responsiveness
of smart HVAC demand but continue to bid the fixed load profile into day-ahead market.
Figure(4.7) shows the comparison of day-ahead and real-time LMP. As it appears, there is a
peak in day-ahead market while this peak is shaved in real-time market. This is not a surprising
result given LSE still bid into the market the fixed load. The high demand of electricity at the
peak hour creates a price spike. Final customers, in turn, respond to the price spike by cutting
its load consumption which shaved the price spike.
Figure 4.7: Day-Ahead vs. Real-Time LMPs at Bus 1 When LSEs Ignore Price-Responsiveness
of Smart HVAC Demand
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LSE profit is defined in equation 4.19. Final customers pay at the day-ahead price PDA
for the quantity of actual consumption QRT . LSE, instead, pays ISO the procurement cost for
the cleared amount QDA at day-ahead price PDA, adjusted by the real-time deviation QDA at
price PRT . The typical day operation profit for the three LSE agents are listed in Table(4.1).
This is not a coincidence that all the LSEs experiences a financial loss for the daily operation.
Go back to Figure(4.7), we can see that LSE purchases power at high day-ahead LMP but
sells back at low real-time LMP. It is more clear to reinspect equation(4.20). LSE’s profit is
a negative product of price deviation and quantity deviation. Given the market setup, price
deviation is caused by load deviation, and they have a positive correlation corr(4P,4Q) > 0.
So, LSE will end up with a financial loss if it fails to forecast the load customers consumption
pattern.
pi = PDA ·QRT − (PDA ·QDA + PRT · (QRT −QDA)) (4.19)
= −(PRT − PDA) · (QRT −QDA) (4.20)
Table 4.1: LSE Profit with Dynamic Pricing Customers
LSE 1 LSE 2 LSE 3
-1582 -2665 -555.7
4.5 LSE with Learning Behavior
As discussed above, LSE has an incentive to forecast final customers energy consumption
behavior to avoid financial loss. But the relevant parameters, such as house thermal features
and people’s preferences, are private information which neither LSE nor ISO has the right to
access to. LSE can only learn from the historical data to try to capture final customer’s new
load profile. The complexity to make load forecast is significantly enlarged when there the
consumer is charged at dynamic price. This is because conventional load forecast only predict
a fixed load level at a specific time point. With the passing of LMP, LSE needs to make a
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forecast of load at both a time point and price level. On the other hand, LSE can only observe
the past realized load level at a specific price level. This historical data has little help for
LSE to retrieve a demand curve. A recent paper Centolella (2010) points out the necessity to
develop new forecast tools to integrate dynamic pricing customers into current power market
operation. But so far, there is no well designed load forecast tools available for the industry
use.
This study is not targeted at developing a forecast tool for LSE to use but check LSE’s
bidding behavior given a new market environment. LSEs are allowed to choose from an action
set for the day-ahead bidding. LSE does not have access to final customers private information
and it can not make a forecast based on load generation mechanism. Instead, LSE learns from
its daily operation profit. LSE tunes up demand bidding to reach a better chance of high profit.
I will firstly show the Q-learning algorithm and then goes to the simulation result.
4.5.1 Q Learning Algorithm
This section starts with a detailed introduction of Q-Learning algorithm and parameters
used for this experiment. By the procedure of Q-Learning, in the nth step the agent observes the
current system state xn , selects an action an, receives an immediate payoff rn, and observes the
next system state yn. The agent then updates its Q-value estimates using a learning parameter
αn and a discount factor γ as follows:
If x = xn, and a = an
Qn(x, a) = (1− αn)Qn−1(x, a) + αn[rn + γVn−1(yn)]
Otherwise,
Qn(x, a) = Qn−1(x, a)
whereVn−1(y) ≡ max
b
{y, b}
(4.21)
LSE then chooses next step’s action according to the probability as defined in the follow:
pD(x, a) = e
Q(x,a)/TD/
∑
b∈ADi
eQ(x,b)/TD (4.22)
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By this algorithm, each agent only updates the Q-value for the action a taken in state of
x. It takes three parts of information to update the Q-value, the last step Q-value Qn(x, a),
current reward rn, and future expectation Vn−1(yn).
The learning parameter α for a state-action pair (x, a) is set to be α = 1/Tωx,a, where Tx,a
is the number of times that action a has been taken in state x. By this setting, agent gives
more weight to the information for the pair x, a when there are few historical information. The
weight will gradually decrease as the agent acquires more information of that pair.
The temperature parameter TD is given by: 1/TD = K × (D)β, where K > 0 and beta < 0
are constants andD is the number of steps that have currently been simulated. At the beginning
stage of simulation, 1/TD is small implying that the choice probability pD(x, a) is close to
uniform distribution so that agent could have chance to explore the action space. As the
simulation goes by, 1/TD increases and the agent assigns high probability to the action with
high Q-value. By doing this, the agent could explore the action space first and finally exploit
to the action that has the best payoff.
Coming down to this experiment, it is assumed that there are two states for every LSE, a
hot day and a cool day. The states corresponds to outdoor temperature, which is illustrated in
Figure(4.8). At the beginning of each day, the state of weather is randomly generated which is
then observed by both the LSE and smart HVAC.
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Figure 4.8: Two States of Outdoor Temperature Path
4.5.2 Simulation Result
The experiment is designed as depicted in flow chart(4.9). At the beginning of this experi-
ment, smart HVAC is introduced to replace conventional HVAC. At each day, LSE observes the
state of weather and chooses a bidding curve. The dashed box represents a learning cycle, which
includes both day-ahead and real-time operation. After the learning cycle, LSE calculates its
daily profit for serving final customers followed by updating belief of taking this bidding curve.
The simulation will stop when reaching the maximum iteration.
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Figure 4.9: Flow Chart of Experiment
Figure(4.10) to Figure(4.12) illustrates the simulation result. Figure(4.10) shows LSEs’
daily average profit through the experiment. We can see at the early stage, LSEs are testing
different bidding curves and get a negative profit. Thereafter, LSE learn to give up bad per-
formed bidding curve and stick with well performed bidding curve. Gradually, all the three
LSEs start to increase their daily profit and finally approaches to 0. Figure(4.11) tells similar
story. There is a clear decreasing trend in LSE load deviation. Less load deviation translates
into higher profit level. In the end of simulation, all the three LSEs have learned to make
bidding curve to minimize load deviation. Figure(4.12) compares the two-settlement price at
the day D=1 and day D=100. In day D=1 there is a big deviation of the two prices as a result
of the significant load deviation. At day D=100, the two markets almost merge together which
represent an efficient market.
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Figure 4.10: LSE Daily Average Profit
Figure 4.11: LSE Hourly Average Load Deviation
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(a) Two Settlement Market at D=1 (b) Two Settlement Market at D=100
Figure 4.12: Market Performance Comparison
4.6 ex-post price passing
In the previous section, we have investigated the market operation with passing day-ahead
price to final customers. As pointed out by Roozbehani et al. (2011), load customers can
response to both ex-ante and ex-post wholesale market price. The mode of passing ex-ante
price is the same as the idea of passing day-ahead price. The market can also charge load
customers ex-post price, which is cleared after actual load is realized. This ex-post price can
be interpreted as real-time price. Load customers do not observe the price charged for the
consumption. Instead, they need to make a prediction of the real-time price. Compared with
the ex-ante price case where LSE lacks of load responsiveness information, passing ex-post
price to final customer lead customers lack of price information at the consumption hour.
Many concerns have been given to the possible high system volatility due to this asymmetric
information problem.
Roozbehani et al. (2011) has proved that the market is stable if the demand elasticity of
price is lower than the supply elasticity. The assumption of this theory is that load customers
have stationary price forecast method. If load customers believe the best forecast for tomorrow’s
price is today’s price, a martingale style price forecast, then the market prices evolvement can
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be captured by Figure(4.14). The day 1’s price p1 is higher than the true price p
∗. Load
customer will consume at a low level d2 at day 2, which will cause a low price p2. This process
will continue until the price and quantity converges to the true level. If demand elasticity is
lower than supply elasticity, this process will converge and vice versa.
There
(a) Low Demand Elasticity of Price (b) High Demand Elasticity of Price
Figure 4.13: Market Price Evolve with Martingale Load Forecast
However, the assumption that load customers stick with one price method is too strong. If
customer find one forecast method performs badly, the good chance is that they will abandon
it. As inspired by LeBaron et al. (1999), I propose an artificial world that each customers can
choose from several price forecast method. They will stick with the well performed methods
and abandon those badly performed ones. During this process, each customer’s action can
affect the other load customer’s payoff and therefore their belief of current action. Because of
this highly non-linear relationship, it is very natural to employ agent-based model to study the
system volatility problem.
4.6.1 Model Setup
I will continue to use the simulation framework to conduct this experiment. As the main
focus is on load customers interaction and system outcome, the network and suppliers infor-
mation is simplified away. So, in this system, there is no transmission line congestion and all
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the customers are located at the same bus, paying for the same LMP.
Supply curve is supposed to be a linear curve:
S(pt) = β × pt (4.23)
For a typical customer i, the load demand contains fixed load dfix,t,i and price-sensitive
load dps,t,i:
dt,i = µ1 × dfix,t,i + µ2 × (1 + δt,i,0)× dps,t,i(pˆt,i) + δt,i,1 (4.24)
where µ1 and µ2 are the weight assigned to fixed load and price-sensitive load. δt,i,0 and δt,i,1
are the white noise to load curve. pˆt,i is customer i’s forecast of price at t. The price-sensitive
load is assumed to be linear:
dps,t,i(pˆt,i) = −α/N × pˆt,i (4.25)
The market is cleared at demand equals supply:
N∑
i
dt,i = β × pt (4.26)
In order to compare with the conclusions in Roozbehani et al. (2011), the demand elasticity
is set to be larger than supply elasticity, with α = 3, and β = 6.
4.6.2 Price Forecast Method
This study tries to evaluate market robustness under the circumstance that ex-post price
is passed to load customers. Load customers must forecast the actual price to make a con-
sumption decision. Customers may hold different opinions about the operation hour’s price.
Their collective action, in turn, affects actual outcome of price. Therefore, price forecast is an
important factors for the emergent behaviors of all the agents. In this section, four methods of
price forecast are provided for load customers to choose from.
1. Mean Value, which is set at the true market price p∗
pˆt,i = p¯; (4.27)
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2. Martingale
pˆt,i = pt−1; (4.28)
3. Moving Average
pˆt,i = 1/2× (pt−1 + pt−2); (4.29)
4. Mean Reverse
pˆt,i = p¯− (pt−1 − p¯) (4.30)
Figure 4.14 shows the market price when there is only one forecast methods adopted by the
load customers. In this figure, only method 1 is stable as we expected. Method 2 and four are
diverging and method 3 is oscillating.
(a) Price Forecast Method 1 Only (b) Price Forecast Method 2 Only
(c) Price Forecast Method 3 Only (d) Price Forecast Method 4 Only
Figure 4.14: Market Price Evolve with One Price Forecast Method Only
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4.6.3 Emergent Behavior with Adaptive Load Agent
This study targets to investigate the collective of load agents given that they have to make a
forecast of future price. The uncertainty of price signal could give rise to severe price volatility
which hurts system stability and increase operation cost dramatically. The agent-simulation
model endows load agents ability to learn from historical price, a result of interaction of all the
load agents. Each agent takes different forecast methods to avoid bad consumption decisions
as a result of bad price forecast. The price pattern emerged from this interaction sheds light
on how robust the market is. Also, severity of price volatility is tested under different scenarios
which may give clue to find key factors affecting system stability.
The simulation starts with a basic scenario, with all four price forecast methods provided
to load agents. There are 20 agents living on the same bus interacting in this game. Figure
4.15 shows the simulation result with realized ex-post price. Market price is very volatile in
the beginning stages and converges quickly. The price volatility in the later stage is caused by
the white noise.
Figure 4.16 shows how agents choose their actions. In the beginning stages, all the four
actions are taken by load agents. But agents gradually converge to action 1 after day 500.
Forecast method 1, by it self, is an unbiased forecast method given everyone use it. During the
learning process, forecast method 1 is not guaranteed to have unbiased forecast. But it does
outperform other forecast methods and finally be adopted by all the load agents.
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Figure 4.15: LMP at hour 1
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Figure 4.16: Price Forecast Methods Taken by Load Agents
4.6.4 Emergent Behavior with Wrong Mean Expectation
In the last subsection, it shown that the right belief leads the market to the right result. It
may be a too strong assumption of right mean value since a single agent should not have the
ability to forecast the right mean value as endowed by the model designer. In this subsection,
the mean value is set to deviate the correct mean. Other simulation parameters keep the same.
Figure 4.17 shows the simulation result with a wrong belief of mean. It is clearly that
in this market, the price is much more volatile than that in the correct mean-value scenario.
Figure 4.18 shows that it takes a longer time for load consumers action to converge. During this
learning process, mean-value method does not outperform other methods. Even if every agent
has that belief, the market will not end up with the believed price. Instead, the moving-average
method becomes the best one that all agents converge to. As shown on Figure 4.14c, if all the
agents converge to this method, the system price will oscillate. This result appears to be a
higher volatility than the basic scenario.
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Figure 4.17: LMP at hour 1 with Wrong Expected Price Mean
Figure 4.18: Price Forecast Methods Taken by Load Agents with Wrong Expected Price Mean
4.6.5 Effect of Agent Numbers on Emergent Behavior
In this subsection, the effect of agent number on system pattern is investigated. Similar
as the subsection 4.6.4, the mean-value is set to be a wrong one. Other parameters are kept
unchanged.
Firstly, the agent number is increased to 100, result of which is shown on Figure 4.19 and
4.20. Compared with the case on Figure 4.17, load agents reach an agreement at a much earlier
stage of the simulation.
Secondly, the agent number is reduced to 5, result of which is shown on Figure 4.19 and
4.20. When the load agent number is small, they fail to reach an agreement and the resulting
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price is very volatile.
These two cases indicate that the number of agents has a nontrivial impact on system
volatility. If the agents number is small, one agent’s behavior change has a significant impact
on the market price and hence other agents’ belief. When there are many load agents, the
population sticking with one forecast method is more stable. The emergent price has a clearer
pattern for the agents to follow.
Figure 4.19: LMP at hour 1 with 100 Load Agents
Figure 4.20: Price Forecast Methods Taken by 100 Load Agents
81
Figure 4.21: LMP at hour 1 with 5 Load Agents
Figure 4.22: Price Forecast Methods Taken by 5 Load Agents
4.6.6 Effect of Available Price Forecast Methods on Emergent Behavior
As already talked in the above subsections, right mean-value forecast method outperform
other forecast methods. After the mean is set at a wrong one, moving average becomes a better
forecast method than other three. In this subsection, I will test the effect of available price
forecast methods on the market price volatility. Number of agents are kept as 20.
Firstly, the best performed right-mean forecast method is removed. Simulation results are
shown on Figure 4.23 and 4.24. Not surprisingly, mean-average forecast method wins just like
that in the case of Figure 4.17. But the price volatility is much less in the learning stage because
the wrong mean forecast method adds extra noise to the market price.
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Secondly, the mean-average forecast method is removed from forecast toolbox. Simulation
results are shown on Figure 4.25 and 4.26. The results show that load agents do not stick with
any particular method. Instead, both of the methods are chosen by the customers. In fact, the
martingale and mean-reverse are totaly two opposite forecast methods. Both of them lead to a
diverge market when used alone. If agents lean to one forecast method, the other one will win
over. Finally, the population of load agents choosing each forecast method keeps at a stable
level. Combination of the two forecast methods keep market price volatility at a moderate
level.
Figure 4.23: LMP at hour 1 with Price Forecast Method 2,3,4 Only
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Figure 4.24: Price Forecast Methods Taken Load Agents with Price Forecast Method 2,3,4
Only
Figure 4.25: LMP at hour 1 with Price Forecast Method 2,4 Only
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Figure 4.26: Price Forecast Methods Taken Load Agents with Price Forecast Method 2,4 Only
4.7 Conclusions
This Chapter investigates the issues of introducing dynamic price to retail load customers.
Under current market structure, wholesale market price is calculated after load is realized. It
creates a time delay to pass real-time price to load customers. One proposed approach is to
pass day-ahead market price to load customers, which is generated in the day-ahead market.
The other approach is to pass real-time market to load customers. Both of the two approaches
are subject to information uncertainty problem.This study tries to assess the application of the
two dynamic pricing approaches.
The contribution of this study lies in four folds:
• A seamed retail and wholesale test bed that provides flexible environment for simulation.
• Design of smart control device accommodating for dynamic price and customer preference.
• Development of LSE learning ability to perform in a day-ahead price passing market
structure
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• Evaluation of market volatility with heterogenous load customers.
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CHAPTER 5. SHORT TERM AND LONG TERM ASSESSMENT OF A
NEWLY PROPOSED PRICE RESPONSIVE DEMAND PROGRAM
On March 15, 2011, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued its final
rule on demand response compensation in FER (). The Final Rule requires ISOs or RTOs
that have tariff provision permitting demand response resources to participate as a resource
in the energy market by reducing consumption of electric energy from their expected levels in
response to price signals must:
• Pay demand response resources the full LMP when these resources have the capability to
balance supply and demand and when payment is cost-effective as determined by a net
benefits test accepted by the Commission
• Allocate the costs proportionally to all entities that purchase from the relevant energy
market in the area(s) where the demand response reduces the market price for energy
The price responsive demand (PRD) program is an alternative approach to encourage final
customers to respond to wholesale market operation condition. As specified by FER (), the
qualified DR resource will be paid for the load curtailment effort based on the difference of their
actual load and estimated baseline. There are many institutional barriers to apply dynamic
pricing approach which charges final customers the marginal wholesale cost directly. The root
of these problems come from the disconnection between wholesale and retail markets. The
wholesale market is run by ISOs or RTOs and comply with FERC orders. However, the retail
level is regulated by state government and lack of the incentive of dynamic retail prices. The
other barrier to pass by dynamic price is the lack of market incentives to invest in enabling
technologies that would allow electric customers and aggregators of retail customers to see and
respond to changes in marginal cost of providing electric services as those costs change. It
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must justify the cost investing on the smart devices before retail customers will be willing to
take dynamic price contract. Due to these barriers, FERC order 745 compromises to over-
compensate final customers to encourage participation of demand response. Per the request of
FERC order, ISOs and RTOs must comply with new market rules to take the bids of demand
response and compensate for the load curtailment action.
The subsidy of PRD customers, as any other subsidy policies, creates distortion and leads
to efficiency loss. Market Surveillance Committee of the California ISO issued a final opinion
on economic issues raised by FERC Order 745, Bushnell et al. (2011) . In this document,
the market surveillance committee explains the drawback of PRD program and predicts the
potential damage to market operation. It proves again that, a bad designed reform can be
worse than no reform.
Using the simulation framework, an agent-based simulation is conducted to study final
customers behavior in response to the new market rules. The study will follow the new market
rules as specified by ISOs to comply with FERC order. Both the short-run and long-run issues
have been tested. In the short fun, DR providers are allowed to bid into wholesale markets
and they may have incentives to maneuver their bids to get the maximum payment. In the
long run, generators capacity revenues are transferred to DR providers, which may end up with
replacing cheap generation resource with inefficient DR resource.
5.1 FERC Order 745 and ISOs compliance
In this section, three of the most outstanding features of the FERC order are discussed.
The net benefit test is the underlying justification for PRD program. Only when the load
customers total payment is reduced could the demand PRD bids be cleared. That, indeed,
defines a floor price for the PRD bidding. Baseline Estimation is the ISOs task to comply with
FERC order. It is the benchmark to determine the quantity of load curtailment and therefore
the payment rewarded to this action. The third feature of FERC order is that it pays final
customers wholesale price LMP for load reduction. As will be discussed below, this payment
includes a saved retail price and extra payment of wholesale price, which is known as double
payment.
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5.1.1 Net-Benefit Test
Net-Benefit Test is to guarantee the reduced energy payment of load customers is no less
than the payment to the dispatched demand-response resources.1 Figure 5.1 illustrates the
layout of Net Benefit Test. Without demand response, market is cleared at price of P0 and
load of L0. After taking DR bids, market is cleared at price of LT and load of PT . Compared
with the no-DR case, load customers save a payment of (P0 − PT )× LT , the area of square B.
DR providers get paid of cleared price of PT , with a payment of PT × (L0 − LT ).
Net Benefit Test determines a threshold price PT as the floor price for DR bids. By defini-
tion, at the point of threshold price the load payment reduction δPT ×QT equals the payment
to DR: ∆QT × PT .
∆PT ×QT = ∆QT × PT (5.1)
∆QT /QT
∆PT /PT
= 1 (5.2)
Therefore, Net-Benefit Test implies that the threshold price should have an elasticity of 1.
This threshold price only depends on the aggregated supply curve. The ISO will determine
and publish a system-wide Net-Benefits Test threshold price at least once per month.
5.1.2 Baseline Estimation
As discussed above, baseline is the tag attached to each DR provider with which the actual
consumption will be compared to determine the real-time load reduction. ISOs objective of the
baseline methodology is to develop an accurate estimate of what the DR provider’s load would
have been, but for any financial incentive to reduce load.
For each 5-minute interval, ISO calculates the mean of a DR provider’s load from the
most recent prior ten non-price responsive days of the same day type. But Frequent load
reductions reduce the population of non-price responsive load intervals from which to draw
the baseline sample. If the number of available non-price responsive intervals falls below the
minimum sample size needed to ensure baseline accuracy, the ISO will include loads from
price-responsive intervals in the baseline sample.The tentative solution will ensure the baseline
1See footnote 162 of the Order 745
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Figure 5.1: Illustration of Net Benefit Test
Graph is from ISO New England Committee and Working Group Meeting Material.
is calculated using a sample of contemporary load data that represents the DR provider’s
normal load.
The concept of baseline integrity price(BIP) is introduced as a criteria to take price-
responsive days metered load to make baseline estimation. Actual metered loads will be in-
cluded in the daily baseline calculation if the actual metered loads are from a day in which the
offer price is less than or equal to the BIP, the LMP in an interval is less than or equal to the
BIP, and the DR provider was scheduled to reduce load in that interval.
In sum, ISOs rules of baseline estimation contains three parts:
• 90/10 Baseline Rolling Update Rules:
BLd+1 = 90% ·BLd + 10% · Pd · IBIP (LMPd) (5.3)
• Baseline Integrity Price (BIP) BIP balances data quality and data frequency
IBIP =

1, if LMPd < BIP ;
0, if LMPd ≥ BIP .
(5.4)
• Two-Hour Adjustment
BL′(t∗) = BL(t∗) + [P (t− 2)−BL(t− 2)] (5.5)
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5.1.3 Pay LMP to Load Reduction
If DR providers bids get cleared, they will be compensated at wholesale price LMP for each
MW of load reduction. Of course, for the curtailed MW of power, the customer does not need
to pay for retail price r. For a load customer who joins the PRD program, the opportunity
cost for using each MW of power equals the incurred price r plus the foregone payment LMP.
This payment subsidy changes load customer incentive to consume. Bushnell et al. (2011)
gives a good example to illustrate the effect of price distortion. A distributed generator can
get a higher payment when is located behind a meter than in front because the behind-meter
generator can get paid both from serving final load customer and DR compensation payment
of LMP.
5.2 Short Term Behavior Test
As discussed above, DR providers load reduction quantity is determined by the difference
of actual electricity consumption and an estimated baseline. Baseline is designed to capture
the load customers electricity consumption be it not interfered by the DR compensation. As
pointed out by Bushnell et al. (2009), it is impossible to observe this counterfactual consumption
level, because we cannot measure something that did not happen.
On one hand, it is impossible to have an accurate estimate of the counterfactual con-
sumption level. Even the best economic or statistical models of a customers hourly electricity
consumption behavior as function of hourly prices and all observable customer and weather
characteristics are only able to explain a small fraction of the variation in that customers con-
sumption of electricity across hours of the year. Therefore, when the actual consumption is low,
for example family goes on vacation, the load customers could still be awarded for a phantom
”load reduction” which is not consumed anyway.
On the other hand, load customers could learn from baseline estimation rules and takes
actions to get extra payment. For example, if load customers have an actual high consumption
level, they would like to avoid bidding into the DR market to avoid the penalty for consuming
higher than baseline. Without paying for potential penalty, these load customers could get a
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higher baseline estimate. When their consumption level is low, they would like to bid all their
possible reduction ability to get paid by DR program.
Realizing the importance of accurate baseline estimation, FERC directed ISOs ”to develop
appropriate revisions and modifications, if necessary, to ensure that their baselines remain
accurate and that they can verify that demand response resources have performed”.2 ISOs
are developing new rules to adjust baseline estimation, rules in section 5.1.2 as an example.
KEMA (2011) uses historical data to show that symmetric baseline adjustment works better
than no-adjustment. But this study uses the realized historical data but ignores load customers
reaction to these rules change. So, it is not convincing to fully implement them in the real
market operation.
To make a better evaluation of current baseline estimation rules, as proposed to be adopted
by ISOs, an agent-based model is set up in this section to investigate how the load customers
will react to the new rules.
5.2.1 Experiment Design
To focus on the baseline inflation problem, this experiment extend the simulation frame-
work, as mentioned in previous sections, to include the behavior of ”DR Prividers”. Features
of this experiment is listed as follow:
• One Settlement Market The simulation framework is simplified to have one settlement
market. DR Providers, LSE, and GenCo bid into this market and get cleared. Their
actual consumption or production follows the dispatch result. So, in this model setup,
there is no consumption or generation deviation problem. Because of this one-settlement
setup, there is no Two-Hour adjustment, which could cause moral hazard problem. In
this study, each agent’s behavior can only be reflected through their bidding behavior
into the market.
• Grid Topology and Market Environment The 5-bus testcase grid is used for this ex-
periment, with the same parameters, including transmission line capacity, bus-to-bus
2FERC order 745 at page 94
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admittance, load profile, generation capacity and generation cost. So, the market would
reach the same dispatch result if there were no demand response.
• LSE and GenCo Both LSE and GenCo are modeled as truth tellers that bid their true
load profile and generation cost into the market.
• ISO ISO’s is in charge of clearing supply and demand, as well as implementing rules
for accommodating demand response. These rules include making net-benefit test and
announcing threshold price, adjusting BIP price, updating DR Providers’ baseline.
• DR Provider In this experiment, DR providers are modeled as agent that has load con-
sumption and could bid into the market. In another word, DR providers bid for the same
entity that have real load service. In this sense, DR providers are modeled differently
from the LSE agents in the dynamic pricing studies since LSE does not have the full
information of its serving load.
In this experiment, there are three DR Providers locating at three load buses respectively.
DR Providers’s state is defined as the electricity consumption without the interference of
demand response program. The states are simplified to have only low and high states,
with Slowi = 2.5MW , S
high
i = 7.5MW for i = 1, 2, 3. The three DR Providers’ states
transition follows a Markov Chain process, which means the states only depend on the
states in last period. And the three DR Providers’ states are generated independently so
that DR providers’ states are necessarily to be the same at one period. Slowi,t+1
Shighi,t+1
 =
 0.9 0.1
0.1 0.9
×
 Slowi,t
Shighi,t
 (5.6)
DR Providers’s action is to bid into energy market. The DR bids are taken by ISO the
same as generators’ offers, which take the form of
pi = TP + ai ∗ qi where 0 ≤ qi ≤ Sbi (5.7)
where TP is the threshold price derived form net-benefit test, which implies that DR bids
can not be lower than threshold price. Sbi is DR Providers’ bids of load curtailment limit.
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Also, suppose the true total load reduction cost has the linear form within the actual
load consumption Si
Ci = ci ∗ qi when qi ≤ Si (5.8)
Ci = inf when qi > Si (5.9)
In this study, it is assumed that all the DR providers have the same load reduction cost
and supply offer curve slope, i.e., ci = c and ai = a. Particularly, the value of the two
parameters are a = 10, c = 20, and .The strategic variable for DR Provider is the load
curtailment limit Sbi = α
b
i×Si. To discretize choice space, it is assumed that DR provider
can only choose from four actions, from lowest bids to the highest bids:
αbi ∈ {0, 0.3, 0.6, 1} (5.10)
After the market is cleared, each DR provider receives a signal of the cleared load re-
duction q∗i . The DR provider’s actual load consumption li equals BLi − q∗i sot that DR
provider can fulfill its commitment to curtail load. The actual load reservation value C∗i
equals (Si− li)×c. The DR provider’s reward for joining PRD program r∗i is p∗i ×q∗i −C∗i .
At each day, after the market is cleared, DR Provider i updates its belief of the state-
action pair {Si, Sbi }. PR Providers adopt the Q-learning algorithms as discussed before.
• Flow Diagram The experiment runs as follow:
Figure 5.2: Experiment Design
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5.2.2 Simulation Result
This simulation tries to evaluate the baseline estimation rules as adopted or will be adopted
by the ISOs and the impact on load customer’s behavior. As discussed in section 5.1.2, BIP is
used to adjust baseline estimation. If BIP is set very low, days qualified for baseline update
will shrink and ISO do not have enough new information to update baseline estimation. If BIP
is set too high, then for some of the event days, the actual usage deviates far away from the
actual non-interfered load which will under estimate DR Provider’s baseline. So, ISO is seeking
a proper BIP to balance between data availability and data quality.
Figure 5.3 shows the LMPs at the three buses without penetration of demand response
program. At BIP = 30, it is higher than LMPs on bus 3 but lower that on bus 1 and 2 for
most of the time. With this BIP, DR Provider 3’s baseline will be updated for most of the time
while DR Provider 1’s baseline will not change.
Figure 5.3: LMPs without Demand Response
Table 5.1 shows DR Provider’s choice probability at low BIP = 30. The result shows that
DR Provider 1 has incentive to bid in the full load capacity at both low and high state. DR
Provider 2 has incentive to bid the full load capacity at low state but avoid bidding into the
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market at high load state. DR Provider 3 has similar action as Provider 2.
As discussed above, if get dispatched a DR Provider receives payment of (BLi−li)×p∗i from
ISO, and incurs a load reservation value of (Si − li)× c. Therefore DR Provider has incentive
to send a higher bids when the actual load state Si is lower than BLi. In the simulation result,
DR Provider 2 and DR Provider 3 bid their full capacity at low state but withhold from bidding
into the market at high state. By this strategy, they can get free reward when the actual load
level is low. When their actual load is high, it is best for them not to bid into the market.
At the same time, the electricity price LMP also matters. If LMP is much higher than load
reservation value, it is still worthwhile to curtail load even if the estimated baseline is less than
the actual load state and DR Provider’s load reduction is not fully compensated. DR Provider
1’s action falls into this scenario. It bids all the capacity into market at both high and low
states.
Figure 5.4 shows ISO’s baseline estimation for the three DR Providers. At off-peak hour,
LMPs at bus 1 and 2 are higher than BIP, so their baselines are not updated and keep at
the original level. LMP at bus 3 is lower than BIP, and DR Provider 3’s baseline estimate
keeps changing. Because baseline is updated when DR Provider 3 curtailed its load, baseline
estimation can be lower than its baseline. For this reason, DR Provider 3’s action at low state
does not converge to one action. It still tries lower DR bids at low state for the benefit to
raise baseline estimation. At peak hour, all the three LMPs are higher than BIP so that their
baselines are not updated. Therefore, all of the three do not have the incentive to withhold
their load capacity.
The simulation result with BIP = 60 is illustrated in Table 5.3 and Figure 5.5. The main
difference between Table 5.3 and 5.1 is that DR Provider 1 changes its action at high state to
withhold bidding. The reason can be found on Figure 5.5 where baseline estimation for all the
three agents start to change. Baseline estimation for DR Provider 1 is lower than the starting
point. So, it is not worthwhile to bid full capacity into the market which requires higher load
reservation value.
Another difference is that DR Provider 3 converges to the action α = 0.6, a moderate high
states. It has the same reason as stated above. Because the LMP at bus 3 is the lowest and
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baseline is updated at each day, it is not the best to bid all the capacity into the market which
may end up with a very low baseline estimation.
Table 5.1: Agent Choice Probability with BIP=30
Submitted Capacity α = 0 α = 0.3 α = 0.6 α = 1
DR Provider 1, low state 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
DR Provider 1, high state 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
DR Provider 2, low state 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
DR Provider 2, high state 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
DR Provider 3, low state 0.0 0.53 0.0 0.47
DR Provider 3, high state 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(a) Off-Peak Hour, h=1 (b) Peak Hour, h=18
Figure 5.4: Daily Baseline Estimation with BIP=30
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Table 5.2: Agent Choice Probability with BIP=60
Submitted Capacity α = 0 α = 0.3 α = 0.6 α = 1
DR 1, low state 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
DR 1, high state 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
DR 2, low state 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
DR 2, high state 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
DR 3, low state 0.0 1.0 0 0
DR 3, high state 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(a) Off-Peak Hour, h=1 (b) Peak Hour, h=18
Figure 5.5: Daily Baseline Estimation with BIP=60
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Table 5.3: Agent Choice Probability with BIP=0
Submitted Capacity α = 0 α = 0.3 α = 0.6 α = 1
DR 1, low state 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
DR 1, high state 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
DR 2, low state 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
DR 2, high state 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
DR 3, low state 0.0 0 0.0 1.0
DR 3, high state 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(a) Off-Peak Hour, h=1 (b) Peak Hour,h=18
Figure 5.6: Daily Baseline Estimation with BIP=0
5.3 Long Term Behavior Test
In the last section, I studied the short-term behavior of DR Providers following the market
rules adopted in ISOs. In this section, I will turn the focus on the long-term effect of introducing
the PRD program as requested by FERC order. A major concern of the FERC ordered PRD
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program is the double payment issue. If a DR agent is dispatched in the energy market, it will
be paid by wholesale price LMP and also save retail payment of r. So, DR providers, in fact,
has a stronger incentive to join the market.
PRD program, by the definition, is a wealth transfer from supplier to consumers. Because
of the load curtailment, price peaks are likely to be shaved. However, price peak is the main
revenue source for the peak unit because most of peak units can only be dispatched at the
peak hour. The portion of LMP that exceeds its marginal cost will compensate peak unit’s
fixed cost, which is known as capacity revenue. The wealth transfer from supplier to consumers
affect all the generators. The inframarginal generators, assuming their dispatch time is not
changes, gain less revenue during the operation hour since LMP are kept lower than before.
It is even worse for marginal generators since there are chances that they lose the position of
marginal units. The loss of capacity revenue leads to less investment in the new capacity.
But this wealth transfer should not be a problem if the new technology is paid the correct
price. The more efficient technology finally replaces more expensive and inefficient technologies.
Joskow (2006) points out the introduction of demand response will solve the ”missing money”
problems of energy market. ”Missing money” problem is caused by the fact that energy market
price can only reflect the marginal cost of marginal units. The fixed cost of the marginal
units can not be compensated from energy market. Joskow (2006) also shows that given
the generation capacities are in the optimum level, all generators lose money to compensate
fixed cost to the same extent of marginal generators. Demand response, being viewed as
a new generation technology, has very high marginal cost but zeros fixed cost as compared
with conventional generation technology. Therefore, demand response will be dispatched as
a marginal generator when the system experiences a stress of meeting demand. Given the
zero fixed cost of demand response, all the generators will get fully compensated from energy
market.
But as in the requested PRD program, DR Providers get double paid which gives them a
wrong signal to joint the market. Firstly, it will increase the opportunity cost for load customers
to use electricity, which may cause inefficiently load curtailment. The over participation of
demand response will squeeze off the capacity revenues of the conventional generation units.
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As discussed in the report by Bushnell et al. (2011), they believe the benefit of shaving peak
load will not last. The inefficient wealth transfers will leave incremental generation with a
sub-normal return on equity, which means either that
• supply will exit or new supply will fail to enter, leading to a leftward shift in the supply
curve compared to where it would have been otherwise
• the market will correct the problem by raising prices to a level sufficient to increase
investment, putting an end to the transfers.
There is no other outcome. Investment in new supply will cease until the market returns to
generation again to cover capacity costs.
For this study, I will run an agent-based model to simulate market dynamics of electricity
market after the door is open to price responsive load. Particularly, the conventional generators’
investment decisions on new capacity are examined so that this is a long-term study. A key
question being asked to study investment problem is what information the agents take into
investment decision making. Among many work in answering this question, the study by
Bushnell and Ishii (2007) creates a flexible framework to study the dynamics of investment
decisions with strategic short-term bidding. The investment decisions used by Bushnell and
Ishii (2007) is forward looking, which requires generators to predict its investment decisions
on future market environment and find the best path to maximize its own predicted current
revenue. Given every generators makes its optimal investment decisions, a Nash-Equilibrium
is reached. The discussion of investment decisions are beyond the scope of this study. Also,
agent-based simulation is not seeking for the Nash-Equilibrium, but only mimics each agent’s
behavior.
The rules for generator agents’ capacity investment decisions are back-ward looking. If they
can not gain enough revenue from energy market to compensate the capacity cost, they will not
invest 100 percent to replace retired capacity. This simple rule-of-thumb lead generator agent
to make investment decision. The detail of experiment design can be found in the following
subsection.
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5.3.1 Experiment Design
5.3.1.1 Experiment Flow
As briefly talked in last section, the key assumption of this experiment is that investment
decision is backward-looking, which means that generators make myopic investment decisions
using only the past information. Particularly, it is assumed that generators investment decisions
follows the rule in Equation 5.11
Capt+1i = (90% + 10%×
Rti
ci × Capti
)× Capti (5.11)
where Capti is generator i’s generation capacity at period t. ci is investment cost per MW
of capacity for generator i, which is kept constant through the experiment. Rti is the capacity
revenue collected by generator i from energy market at period t. By Equation 5.11, for every
period 10 percent of capacity will be retired and need to be replaced by new investment. The
investment decision is determined by the revenue/cost ratio. The new installed capacity exceeds
retired capacity if capacity revenue is larger than capacity cost, and vice versa.
Figure 5.7 shows the main flow diagram for this experiment and 5.8 shows the sub-flow
diagram for two processes as appear in the dashed table of main flow diagram. The experiment
starts with the initialization as shown in 5.8a. This process formulates a power market in
equilibrium when there is no demand response. The market is cleared using generators supply
curve, load profile and grid network. Generators calculate capacity revenues from participating
in the energy market, which equals the difference between payment received from ISO and
operational cost. It is assumed that capacity revenue could just cover capacity investment cost
so that there is no need for a capacity market to guarantee the return of capacity investment.
So that capacity cost per MW ci is be calculated.
Also, it is assumed that load growth rate equals zero so that the system is in steady state.
The power market can be thought of compared with a steadily growing reference so that the
load growth can be thought of as zero. To release this assumption will not hurt the main
conclusions of this simulation model, but will add unnecessary details.
After the initialization, demand response is taken into the market and the equality between
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capacity revenue and capacity cost is broken. Generators capacity starts to evolve correspond-
ing to capacity revenue change.
Figure 5.7: Main Flow Diagram
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(a) Initialization (b) Daily Operation
Figure 5.8: Experiment Flow Diagram
5.3.1.2 Demand and Supply Agents
In this experiment, the transmission grid and generators location follow that in the simu-
lation framework. So, in this test cast there are 5 buses, 5 GenCos, and 3 LSEs. GenCos and
LSEs are located at the buses as before.
However, transmission capacity and generation portfolio are modified to fit into this exper-
iment design. In this experiment, there is no transmission line capacity limit. Because of this
convenience, an aggregated supply curve can be formulated. Also, the generator’s operation
cost parameter are modified to fit into an exponential curve, which is used to estimate the
aggregated supply curve in the following experiment. The generation cost parameter can be
found in Figure 5.9 and Table 5.4.
GenCo’s Operation Cost
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Figure 5.9: Aggregated Supply Curve
Table 5.4: GenCo’s Supply Curve Parameters, MC = a · x+ b where 0 < x < capacity
GenCo b a capacity
Gen 1 31.10 0.0055 110
Gen 2 31.71 0.0084 100
Gen 3 32.55 0.0344 520
Gen 4 50.43 0.1252 200
Gen 5 30.00 0.0018 600
At each iteration, each generator’s capacity varies as new investment changes relative to
retired capacity. The new estimated aggregated supply curve is formulated by using the in-
formation from each generator’s new supply curve. Firstly, the each generator’s new supply
curve is discretized by chopping supply curve into a series of step functions as a pair of {cji , qji }.
Then the pairs from al the generators are collected and sorted according to the cost order. The
quantity qji is then replaced by accumulated quantity Qk with associated cost Ck = c
j
i , where
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the accumulated quantity is defined as Qk =
∑
cji<Ck
qji . The data pairs Ck, Qk are then fitted
into exponential curve as follow:
C = θ1 + θ2 ∗ exptheta3×Qk
Using estimated parameters {θ1, θ2, θ3}, the point with elasticity of 1 can be found and the
threshold price TP can be found. This whole process follows the FERC order 745 and will be
implemented in ISOs market operation.
All the loads are located on the load buses. LSEs bid the fixed load profile into energy
market. DR Providers are formulated as sperate agents that bid demand response offers into
energy market. DR Providers are modeled as agents with interruptible load Qd and load
reservation value Cd. DR Provider d bids the interruptible load Qd into energy market at the
price Bk = Ck − r. This is because interruptible’s opportunity cost is the payment from ISO
plus saved retail cost. Therefore, DR Provider has incentive to bid into energy market with
bids less than their load reservation value.
Suppose distribution of all DR Provider’s reservation value for electricity follows a normal
distribution, Cd ∼ N(µ, σ2), as shown in Figure 5.10. The parameters for this distribution is
listed in Table 5.5. Therefore, total quantity of DR bids can be retrieved from the distribution
of load reservation value. As shown on Figure 5.10, with paying DR Provider full LMP, total
amount of bids from DR is the area A1 plus A2 because DR Providers with load reservation
value B + r have incentive to take the price of B.
Q = V × (Fµ,σ2(B + r)− Fµ,σ2(r)
where V is the total volume of interruptible load
(5.12)
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Figure 5.10: DR Cost Distribution
Table 5.5: Load Reservation Value Distribution Parameters
Mean µ Variance σ2 Retail Rate r DR Volume V
150 $/MWh 70 ($/MWh)2 30 $/MWh 300 MW
5.3.2 Simulation Results and Analysis
Simulation runs with two cases, paying DR Providers with full LMP , versus paying DR
Providers with LMP − r. In both of the two cases, simulation stops at reaching a new equi-
librium.
Figure 5.11 shows the simulation results for the first case of paying DR Providers full LMP.
The northwest graph illustrates the evolvement path of generators capacity. Clearly, all the five
generators experienced a loss of generation capacity at the beginning stage of DR penetration.
This is because wholesale price is lowered when the market is open to demand response. The
southeast graph of Figure 5.12 shows a deep drop of load weighted price. The southeast graph
of Figure 5.11 shows the hourly price at different stages of this simulation. The peak hour
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price is shaved to be flat, and much lower than the benchmark case. The off-peak hour price
does not change because the LMP is lower than the threshold price, as shown on the southwest
graph of Figure 5.11, and therefore DR bids are not dispatched. On the other hand, due to
the penetration of demand response, the dispatched power output of conventional generators
drops, which is illustrated on the northeast graph of Figure 5.11. As both price and dispatched
quantity drop, generators’ capacity revenue from energy market shrinks, leading to a universal
drop of generation capacity.
As conventional generators’ capacity drops, there is not enough generation resource to serve
the load and the low wholesale price can not be sustainable. The southeast graph of Figure
5.12 shows that wholesale price gradually pick up. The southeast graph of Figure 5.11 also
shows that both peak and off-peak hour price rises up. It is interesting that at iteration year 19,
peak-hour price is set by other conventional generators. In another word, DR Provider becomes
inframarginal and more expensive generators are called to serve peak load. But in the off-peak
hour, DR Provider becomes marginal unit which sets wholesale price at threshold price. This
is because without DR, conventional generators can not keep wholesale price lower than DR’s
threshold price. Therefore, both the peak and off-peak hour price increases as conventional
generators withdraw from the market.
The northwest graph of Figure 5.11 shows that the retreat of conventional generators slows
down gradually. Particularly, generator 3’s capacity even increases. In fact, as shown on
the northeast graph of Figure 5.11, the average output of generator 3 increases even before
its capacity starts to pick up. In contrast, baseload generator 1’s capacity and output has
exactly the same shape. This is because generator 1 has the lowest operational cost and will be
dispatched to the full capacity. Generator 3 has a higher operational cost and is not dispatched
to the full capacity. As cheapest resource is retreating from the market and DR can not cover
all the remaining load, the more expensive generator 3 is dispatched at a higher rate. With
the increase of dispatched output, generator 3 gets a higher revenue from energy market and
has incentive to invest more in capacity. Northwest graph of Figure 5.11 shows that at the new
equilibrium, generator 3’s capacity overpasses that of generator 5.
Both southeast graphs on Figure 5.11 and 5.12 illustrate that at the new equilibrium,
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wholesale price is lower than the original equilibrium. This is because DR has penetrated
into energy market, which replaces other conventional generators’ capacity. If there were a
higher a price in the new equilibrium, it would support a higher total capacity of conventional
generators. This conflict means that the new equilibrium is not reached.
Figure 5.12 also summarizes some criteria to judge the process of introducing demand
response by paying full LMP. The southwest graph illustrates the total cost to serve system
load. The total cost is defined as the sum of generator operational cost, generator capacity
cost and DR Provider load reduction cost. Clearly, this graph shows a increase of total cost to
serve an unchanged system load.
The northeast graph shows that load customers’ payment, in fact, is also steadily increasing
as compared with benchmark case. Load customers payment drops only in the first year, when
the generation portfolio is not changed. This decrease of payment is guaranteed by ISO’s net-
benefit test. But this net-benefit test only examines the payment when generation capacity is
fixed. In a longer term, withdraw of generation capacity already raises wholesale price to a
high level. The short-term net-benefit test can not capture the effect of a long-term change.
As a comparison, the second case of paying DR Provider of LMP-r is also simulated. Figure
5.13 and 5.14 illustrates the simulation results. It can be seen that, market evolvement follows
a similar pattern as that of the first case. But the impact on market is much less. Northwest
graph of Figure 5.14 shows a much lower penetration level of demand response. This is be-
cause by paying DR the LMP-r, much less load customers have incentive to curtail their load.
Generator’s capacity and output is mush less affected by demand response penetration.
However, the northeast and southwest graphs of Figure 5.14 shows different results. In the
second case, load customer’s payment is less than that of the benchmark, which means that load
customers are better off. Also the second case, the total cost to serve system load decreases.
This result is not surprising because by paying DR Providers the price LMP-r, correct price
information is passed to load customers.
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5.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, the potential impact of FERC order 745 is analyzed using an agent-based
model. The three most outstanding features of FERC order 745 are paying customers full
LMP, baseline estimation and net-benefit test. The first two features direct ISO how to pay DR
Providers for the load reduction. The third feature states the underlying reason to implement
price responsive load program. Without carefully examining the potential effect as caused by
this FERC order 745, that may bring unexpected damage and disorder to current power market
system.
Both a short-term and long-term study have been conducted in this chapter. The short-term
study focuses on the baseline inflation problem, which involves a adverse-selection and moral-
hazard issues. The simulation shows current baseline forecast methods can not well capture
load customers true consumption level since people may react to the rules and intentionally
inflate their baseline estimation. Particularly, load customers appear to bid all capacity at the
low load state to get extra payment but withhold capacity at high load state to inflate baseline
estimation.
The long-term study inspect the issues brought by double-payment and concept of net-
benefit test. The simulation result shows that paying load customers full LMP will force more
efficient generation out of the market, leading to a increase of total cost to serve system load.
The underlying logic of lowering load customers electricity payment also fails in the long-term.
The net-benefit test can not capture the long-term effect caused by retreat of conventional
generators.
Both of the two studies suggest that current FERC order 745 may, at least, neglect some
important issues that can cause efficiency loss. Paying load customers by LMP-r can induce
the right amount of demand response resulting in a better result in terms of both customer
payment and total cost. But paying load customers by LMP-r still can not solve the short-
term baseline inflation problem. All these suggest that passing dynamic wholesale price to load
customers be a better choice to connect wholesale and retail electricity markets.
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CHAPTER 6. TEST OF WHOLESALE POWER MARKET BUYERS
STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR UNDER DIFFERENT MARKET CLEARING
RULES
6.1 Introduction
In this Chapter, focus will be given to wholesale power buyers, LSEs, potential strategic
behavior in a two-settlement market. Even though LSE does not serve price-sensitive load
customers, it still has incentive to submit price-sensitive bids into day-ahead market. The
reason for LSE to submit price-sensitive bids is that if day-ahead price is too expensive, they
would rather wait until the real-time market.
Except this natural reason for price-sensitive bids, LSE with monopsony power intentionally
bid low into day-ahead market to lower day-ahead price. Borenstein et al. (2008) discussed
LSEs strategic behavior during California electricity crisis. During the crisis, LSEs have strong
incentive to control their procurement cost. Figure 6.1 illustrates how big LSE exerts market
power. LSE is serving a fixed load Qf +Qd which is out of control of LSE. If LSE only submits
load Qf into day-ahead market, the cleared day-ahead price Pda will be lower than the would-be
day-ahead price P ∗da. Then LSE’s total procurement cost for serving a fixed load Qf +Qd will
be
C = Pda ×Qf + Prt ×Qd
Real-time price Prt is not affected by LSE day-ahead market bidding given fixed load and
supply function. Therefore, LSE could lower its total procurement cost C if it bids low in the
day-ahead market and lowers clear price Pda.
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Figure 6.1: LSE Strategic Trading During California Crisis
As discussed in Borenstein et al. (2008), price spread between forward market and spot
market is not eliminated by traders’ arbitrage behavior. Reasons of power market inefficiency
can be attributed to the institutional barriers and traders lack of appropriate information.
Price convergence between day-ahead and real-time market has been given big attention of
ISO’s market power mitigation department. Figure 6.2 illustrates that the DA-RT price differ-
ence concentrates in a a reasonable range. The price difference has a symmetric distribution,
different from the low DA price pattern as appeared in California electricity crisis. This chapter
tries to reexamine the current two-market structure and investigates its impact on big LSE’s
strategic behavior.
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(a) Off-Peak Hours (b) Peak Hours
Figure 6.2: Hourly DA-RT Price Spread within MISO Footprint
6.2 Two-Settlement and Reliability Commitment
Due to the purpose of this study, it is worthwhile to reexamine the two-settlement system
as adopted by most ISOs or RTOs. Day-ahead market is a pure financial market, where LSEs,
GenCos, and other traders trade power. Although GenCos are required to keep the supply curve
unchanged when it goes to real-time market. There is no such requirement for LSE, leaving
LSE large space to change their bidding curve. Day-ahead market plays a hedge function for
market participants to avoid exposing to more volatile real-time price.
But the physical resource commitment function is separated from day-ahead market. This
commitment decision is taken as an irreversible process because it takes a long time and cost
to change the status of a generator unit (hot, warm, stand-by, cold). ISO’s main task is to
guarantee there are enough resource to meet real-time load. If the demand/supply balance can
not keep, the system has risk to collapse. Because the power buyer does not have the obligation
to keep system wide reliability. Therefore, ISO runs unit commitment using load forecast of
itself, which is known as ”reliability assessment commitment” (RAC). Again, this process is a
pure physical process and does not generate price signal.
When it goes to operating day, the real-time market has both financial and physical func-
tionality. The market is cleared using current on-line resources (hot, warm units). The available
units in the real-time is a subset of that in day-ahead market. So, the price volatility is much
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higher than day-ahead market. A summary of this process can be found in Figure 6.3.
Figure 6.3: Market Operation Line for MISO
In this study, three different market clear rules are compared, as listed in Table 6.1. The
”No UC” rule means that ISO does not make unit commitment decisions and will keep all
the generators ready to use in the real-time market. The ”BUC” rule means bid-based unit
commitment. By this name, ISO runs unit commitment using LSE’s demand bids. The ”RAC”
rule means that ISO runs unit commitment using its own load forecast.
Figure 6.4 through 6.6 illustrates how the three rules work. Particularly, for each rule, LSE’s
bids have different effect on supply curve. Clearly, LSE bids do not affect supply curve since
generation resources do not need to be committed. In the Bid-based Unit Commitment case,
LSE bids affect both day-ahead and real-time market. LSE will reduce on-line resource if LSE
bids low. In the Reliability Assessment Commitment case, LSE bids can only affect day-ahead
supply function but has no effect on the real-time supply function. These rule differences give
LSE different incentives to exert market power.
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Table 6.1: Market Clearing Rules Comparison
No UC BUC RAC
Functionality Only Financial Func-
tion
Both Financial and
Physical Function
Seperate Financial and
Physical Function
Effect of LSE
Bids on Supply
No Impact DA and RT Supply
Function
Only DA Supply Func-
tion
Reliability No Guarantee Not Fully Guaranteed Guaranteed
Load Used to
Clear Market
Bid Bid Bid for Financial Pur-
pose, Load Forecast for
Physical Purpose
Market Perfor-
mance
To Be Studied
Figure 6.4: No Unit Commitment
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Figure 6.5: Bid-based Unit Commitment
Figure 6.6: Reliability Assessment Commitment
6.3 Experiment Setup
This section talks about the experiment set up and gives tables of parameter values.
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6.3.1 Unit Commitment and Implementation
The unit commitment function of the simulation framework is turn on to run this exper-
iment. Day-ahead market is cleared using two steps. The first step solves a mixed-integer
optimization problem as shown from equation (6.1) to (6.9). This steps comes out with a (0,1)
decisions for each generator to indicate if this generator will be used for next step.
min
i,t
∑
t
∑
i
zitFit +
∑
t
∑
i
gitCit +
∑
t
∑
i
yitSit +
∑
t
∑
i
xitHit +
∑
t
∑
i
ditBit (6.1)
subject to:
power balance
∑
i git = Dt =
∑
i dit ∀t, (6.2)
reserve
∑
i rit ≥ SDt ∀t, (6.3)
min generation git ≥ zitMINi ∀i, t, (6.4)
max generation git + ri,t ≤ zitMAXi ∀i, t, (6.5)
ramp rate pos limit git ≤ git−1 +MxInci ∀i, t, (6.6)
ramp rate neg limit git ≥ git−1 −MxDeci ∀i, t, (6.7)
start if-then-on zit ≤ zit−1 + yit ∀i, t, (6.8)
normal line flow limit
∑
i rit ≥ SDt ∀k, t, (6.9)
The second step solves a DC optimization of power flow problem, as shown from equation
(6.10) to (6.16). All the generator k is the committed generator from step 1. In this step, the
LMP, power line flow, and power dispatch results are solved.
min
Pgk
∑
k∈{commited generator buses}
sgkPgk (6.10)
subject to:
power injection equation P = B′ · θ (6.11)
line flow equation PB = (D ·A · θ), (6.12)
line flow limit −PB,max ≤ PB ≤ PB,max, (6.13)
generator capacity limit 0 ≤ Pgk ≤ Pgk,max,∀k ∈ {generatorbuses} (6.14)
real-time load Pdk = P
rt
dk,∀k ∈ {loadbuses} (6.15)
power injection Pk = Pgk − Pdk, k = 1, . . . , N (6.16)
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For the bids-based unit commitment, dit in equation (6.2) uses LSEs demand bids. For the
reliability assessment commitment, the day-ahead market commitment is solved using LSEs
bids. The real-time market commitment is solved using ISO’s load forecast.
6.3.2 Environment and Agents
This study uses a 4 bus, 5 lines, 3 GenCo, 2LSE topology. The parameters of this grid can
be found on Figure 6.7. The parameters of GenCos supply function and LSE load profile can
be found in Table 6.2.
Figure 6.7: Grid Network for Experiments (standard IEEE 4 bus test case)
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Table 6.2: Experiment Parameter Settings
GenCo 1 GenCo 2 GenCo 3 LSE 1 LSE 2
GenCo True Capacity
Lower Capacity Limit 0.5 0.375 0.48
Upper Capacity Limit 2 1.5 2.2
LSE True Load 2.6 0.6
GenCo True Cost
Supply Offer Slope 52 100 80
Supply Offer Ordinate 1289.6 1211 1289.6
LSE Strategic Action
Fixed Load Bid X 0.6
Load Maximum 2.6 Y
Demand Bid Slope -50 -100
Demand Bid Ordinate 1300 1400
6.3.3 Fictitious Play
In game theory, fictitious play is a learning rule first introduced by G.W. Brown (1951).
In it, each player presumes that her/his opponents are playing stationary (possibly mixed)
strategies. At each round, each player thus best responds to the empirical frequency of play of
his opponent. Such a method is of course adequate if the opponent indeed uses a stationary
strategy, while it is flawed if the opponent’s strategy is non stationary. The opponent’s strategy
may for example be conditioned on the fictitious player’s last move.
In this experiment, only LSEs are modeled as intelligent players. Their strategic variables
are the demand bids, as shown in red character on Table 6.2.
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This experiment employs a sequential fictitious game structure. The game flow is shown on
Figure 6.8.
Figure 6.8: Sequential Alternative Strategic Behavior
6.4 Experiment Result
6.4.1 Overview of LSE Procurement Cost
LSE’s procurement cost is illustrated on Figure 6.9.
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(a) LSE 1 Procurement Cost (b) LSE 2 Procurement Cost
Figure 6.9: Baseline Estimate with BIP=30
Figure 6.10 shows the simulation result of this fictitious play. Without UC, the LSE 1 bids
at a load level at 1.9, lower than the true load of 2.6. LSE 2 bids at 0.7, higher than the true
load level of 0.6.
Figure 6.11 illustrates the benefit change of the players along the simulation path. At the
new equilibrium, both of the two LSEs are better off in terms of lower procurement cost. But
both the two GenCos collect less money from the energy market.
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Figure 6.10: LSE Bidding Without Unit Commitment
Figure 6.11: Net Earnings without Unit Commitment
Figure 6.10 shows the simulation result of this fictitious play. Without UC, the LSE 1 bids
at a load level at 2.5, very close to the true load of 2.6. LSE 2 bids at 0.68, higher than the
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true load level of 0.6.
Figure 6.11 illustrates the benefit change of the players along the simulation path. At the
new equilibrium, neither LSEs procurement cost or GenCos net earning has big change.
Figure 6.12: LSE Bidding with Bid-Based Unit Commitment
Figure 6.13: Net Earnings with Bid-Based Unit Commitment
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Figure 6.10 shows the simulation result of this fictitious play. Without UC, the LSE 1 bids
at a load level at 2.25, lower than the true load of 2.6. LSE 2 bids at 0.87, higher than the true
load level of 0.6.
Figure 6.11 illustrates the benefit change of the players along the simulation path. At the
new equilibrium, neither LSEs procurement cost or GenCos net earning has big change.
Figure 6.14: LSE Bidding with RAC
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Figure 6.15: Net Earnings with RAC
6.5 Conclusions
In this experiment, three market clear rules are examined in terms of LSE’s strategic be-
havior. The simulation result shows that in the no-UC situation, the LSEs have the strongest
incentive to deviate from their true load. The Bids-based commitment does the best in damp-
ening LSEs strategic behavior incentives. This is because LSEs bids affect both the DA and
RT supply function. Their load withholding behavior will not reduce price too much. In the
reliability assessment commitment case, LSEs have moderate incentives to withhold their load.
This is because LSEs strategic behavior is not penalized by the high real-time price.
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CHAPTER 7. Conclusions
U.S. restructured wholesale power markets are large-scale systems encompassing physical
constraints, administered rules of operation, and strategic human participants. The complexity
of these systems makes it difficult to model and study them using standard analytical and sta-
tistical tools. To compensate this gap, this study develops and uses an agent-based simulation
framework to systematically investigate the performance of these markets through intensive
computational experiments.
Using this simulation framework, the study examines many issues of the restructured power
market. The main focus of this study is demand response, one of the three top initiatives of
FERC. The other two FERC top initiatives are smart grid and renewable energy, both of which
are also closely related with demand response. Without smart grid technology, final consumers
can not observe or respond to wholesale market operation condition. Demand response, on the
other hand, is taken as an important resource to compensate intermittency of renewable energy.
Without demand response, the low demand elasticity induces generators to play games in the
wholesale market. Without demand response, expensive peaker units are needed to satisfy the
less frequent events of spike load. Though saying benefits of demand response, this industry
also worries about the uncertainty and volatility brought by demand response. It is dangerous
to implement demand response without carefully inspecting potential problems of rules design
and market participant’s response.
The primary objective of this study is to gain a better understanding of the market per-
formance with incorporating demand response through different approaches. One approach
is to pass dynamic wholesale price to the final consumer, either day-ahead price or real-time
price. The other approach is to let demand bids into wholesale market and performs like gen-
eration resource. This study investigates both of the two approaches and examines the effect
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of asymmetric information on market performance.
The main contributions of the dissertation can be summarized as follow:
1. Explanation for observed profit pattern in the beef industry
• Explanation for different profit patterns of beef industry’s two sectors.
• Support for ”Ricardian Rent Pass-Through” assumption.
2. New simulation framework for studying power market
• DCOPF, and UC algorithm used for wholesale market operation.
• Two-settlement wholesale market
• Q-Learning algorithm that can be used by agents
• Detailed load model that simulates energy generation process
• New market rules for demand response program
• Generation capacity investment and evolvement
3. Integrating retail and wholesale power market with dynamic price
• DA market deviates from RT market without LSE learning
• DA market converges with RT market with LSE learning
• LSE achieves maximum profit with learning ability
• Design of learning consumers that respond to real-time price
• Price volatility decreases with the number of agents and increases with removing
forecast methods
4. Critique of new market rules for demand response
• The design of baseline induces consumer to strategically behave
• Baseline estimation method can not eliminate estimation error
• Under the FERC order, total cost to serve load increases
• Under the FERC order, load customer payment increases
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5. LSE strategic behavior under different market rules
• LSE has incentive to avoid bidding all load into DA market
• LSE bids could affect supply curve with UC rules
• Bid-based UC works best to dampen LSEs strategic behavior
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APPENDIX A. Deviation form of X,S and Q
With this deviation form, equation () can be written as
S∗t+τ = (α− α) + (y∗t+τ − y)− γ[(q∗t+τ − q) + (m∗t+τ−1 −m)]
= uy∗t+τ+1 − γ[Q∗t+τ (1 + r) + um∗t+τ+1]
The deviation form of () is Q∗t+τ = βτQt+
∑τ
i=1 β
τuh∗t+τ−i. Substitute this into the equation
above, we can get:
S∗t+τ = u
y∗
t+τ+1 − γ[(βτQt +
τ∑
i=1
βτuh∗t+τ−i)(1 + r) + u
m∗
t+τ+1] (A.1)
Also rewrite the inter-temporal budget constraint () in deviation form: Xt =
∑∞
τ=0 S
∗
t+t/(1+
g)τ+1. Then substitute equation (A.1) into this budget constraint, which implies:
Xt = − γ(1 + r)
1 + g − βQt +
∞∑
τ=0
v∗t+τ/(1 + g)
τ+1 (A.2)
wherev∗t+τ = u
y∗
t+τ+1 − γum∗t+τ+1 −
(1 + r)γβu∗t+τ
1 + g − β
From this, we can solve for Qt in terms of Xt and u
i∗
t :
Qt =
1 + g − β
γ(1 + r)
[−Xt +
∞∑
τ=0
v∗t+τ/(1 + g)
τ+1] (A.3)
Then insert equation (A.3) into the deviation form of equation(2.13), we can express St in
terms of Xt and u
i∗
t :
St = u
y∗
t+1 − γQt(1 + r)− γum∗t+1 (A.4)
= (1 + g − β)Xt − (1 + g − β)
∞∑
τ=0
v∗t+τ/(1 + g)
τ+1 + uy∗t+1 − γum∗t+1
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Finally, substitute equation () into the deviation form of equation (), we can get the cattle
stock’s path:
Xt+1 = (1 + g)Xt − St (A.5)
= βXt + (1 + g − β)
∞∑
τ=0
v∗t+τ/(1 + g)
τ+1 − uy∗t+1 + γum∗t+1
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APPENDIX B. Reduced Form of X, S, and Q
This appendex is used to show the derivation of X, S, and Q.
Xt =
∞∑
τ=0
(uy∗t+τ+1 − γ[(βτQt + (B.1)
τ∑
i=1
βτuh∗t+τ−i)(1 + r) + u
m∗
t+τ+1])/(1 + g)
τ+1
= −
∞∑
τ=0
(
β
1 + g
)τ
γ(1 + r)
1 + g
Qt +
∞∑
τ=0
(uy∗t+τ+1 − γum∗t+τ+1 −
(1 + r)γβu∗t+τ
1 + g − β )/(1 + g)
τ+1
= − 1
1− β1+g
γ(1 + r)
1 + g
Qt +
∞∑
τ=0
v∗t+τ/(1 + g)
τ+1
= − γ(1 + r)
1 + g − βQt +
∞∑
τ=0
v∗t+τ/(1 + g)
τ+1
where v∗t+τ = u
y∗
t+τ+1 − γum∗t+τ+1 −
(1 + r)γβu∗t+τ
1 + g − β
Qt =
1 + g − β
γ(1 + r)
[−Xt +
∞∑
τ=0
(uy∗t+τ+1 − γum∗t+τ+1 −
(1 + r)γβuh∗t+τ
1 + g − β )/(1 + g)
τ+1] (B.2)
=
1 + g − β
γ(1 + r)
[−Xt +
∞∑
τ=0
(
ρy
1 + g
)τ+1uyt − γ
∞∑
τ=0
(
ρm
1 + g
)τ+1umt ]−
β
ρh
∞∑
τ=0
(
ρh
1 + g
)τ+1uht
=
1 + g − β
γ(1 + r)
[−Xt + 1
1− ρy1+g
ρy
1 + g
uyt − γ
1
1− ρm1+g
ρm
1 + g
umt ]−
β
ρh
1
1− ρh1+g
ρh
1 + g
uht
=
1 + g − β
γ(1 + r)
[−Xt + ρy
1 + g − ρy u
y
t −
γρm
1 + g − ρmu
m
t ]−
β
1 + g − ρhu
h
t
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St = ρyu
y
t − γ(1 + r)
1 + g − β
γ(1 + r)
[−Xt + ρy
1 + g − ρy u
y
t −
γρm
1 + g − ρmu
m
t ] (B.3)
+γ(1 + r)
β
1 + g − ρhu
h
t − γρmumt
= (1 + g − β)Xt + ρy(1 + g − ρy)− ρy(1 + g − β)
1 + g − ρy u
y
t −
γ
ρm(1 + g − ρm)− ρm(1 + g − β)
1 + g − ρm u
m
t +
βγ(1 + r)
1 + g − ρhu
h
t
= (1 + g − β)Xt + ρy(β − ρy)
1 + g − ρy u
y
t − γ
ρm(β − ρm)
1 + g − ρm u
m
t +
βγ(1 + r)
1 + g − ρhu
h
t
Xt+1 = (1 + g)Xt − [(1 + g − β)Xt + ρy(β − ρy)
1 + g − ρy u
y
t − γ
ρm(β − ρm)
1 + g − ρm u
m
t (B.4)
+
βγ(1 + r)
1 + g − ρhu
h
t ]
= βXt − ρy(β − ρy)
1 + g − ρy u
y
t + γ
ρm(β − ρm)
1 + g − ρm u
m
t −
βγ(1 + r)
1 + g − ρhu
h
t
136
APPENDIX C. Reduced Recursive Form of Cow-Calf Return
In this appendex, a clear form of cow-calf return’s recursive form will be derived.
First, from equation(),we can solve for Xt:
Xt = − γ(1 + r)
1 + g − βR
r
t −
γ(1 + r)
1 + g − β
1 + g + β − ρh
1 + g − ρh u
h
t +
ρy
1 + g − ρy u
y
t −
γρm
1 + g − ρmu
m
t
Then forward cow-calf operator’s return () for one period as follow:
Rrt+1 =
1 + g − β
γ(1 + r)
[−Xt+1 + ρy
1 + g − ρy u
y
t+1 −
γρm
1 + g − ρmu
m
t+1] (C.1)
−(1 + g + β − ρh)
1 + g − ρh u
h
t+1
=
1 + g − β
γ(1 + r)
[−Xt+1 + ρy
1 + g − ρy (ρyu
y
t + ε
y
t+1)
− γρm
1 + g − ρm (ρmu
m
t + ε
m
t+1)]−
(1 + g + β − ρh)
1 + g − ρh (ρhu
h
t + ε
h
t+1)
=
1 + g − β
γ(1 + r)
[−Xt+1 +
ρ2y
1 + g − ρy u
y
t+1 −
γρ2m
1 + g − ρmu
m
t+1]−
(1 + g + β − ρh)ρh
1 + g − ρh u
h
t+1 + Ψt+1
where Ψt+1 =
1 + g − β
γ(1 + r)
[
ρy
1 + g − ρy ε
y
t+1 −
γρm
1 + g − ρm ε
m
t+1]
−(1 + g + β − ρh)
1 + g − ρh ε
h
t+1
Then substitute equation () into equation (), the returns for cow-calf operators can be
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recursively expressed as:
Rrt+1 =
1 + g − β
γ(1 + r)
[−βXt + ρy(β − ρy)
1 + g − ρy u
y
t − γ
ρm(β − ρm)
1 + g − ρm u
m
t +
βγ(1 + r)
1 + g − ρhu
h
t (C.2)
+
ρ2y
1 + g − ρy u
y
t −
γρ2m
1 + g − ρmu
m
t ]−
(1 + g + β − ρh)ρh
1 + g − ρh u
h
t + Ψt+1
=
1 + g − β
γ(1 + r)
[−βXt + ρyβ
1 + g − ρy u
y
t −
γρmβ
1 + g − ρmu
m
t ] +
β(1 + g − β)− (1 + g + β − ρh)ρh
1 + g − ρh u
h
t + Ψt+1
=
1 + g − β
γ(1 + r)
[−β(− γ(1 + r)
1 + g − βR
r
t −
γ(1 + r)
1 + g − β
1 + g + β − ρh
1 + g − ρh u
h
t +
ρy
1 + g − ρy u
y
t −
γρm
1 + g − ρmu
m
t )
+
ρyβ
1 + g − ρy u
y
t −
γρmβ
1 + g − ρmu
m
t ] +
β(1 + g − β)− (1 + g + β − ρh)ρh
1 + g − ρh u
h
t + Ψt+1
= βRrt + (
(1 + g + β − ρh)
(1 + g − ρh) (β − ρh) +
β(1 + g − β)
1 + g − ρh )u
h
t + Ψt+1
In sum, the recursive form for Rrt can be written as
Rrt+1 = βR
r
t + λu
h
t + Ψt+1 (C.3)
where λ =
(1 + g + β − ρh)
(1 + g − ρh) (β − ρh) +
β(1 + g − β)
1 + g − ρh
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APPENDIX D. Counterpart in Rosen (1994)
The counterpart of equation () in Rosen (1994) is summarized as:
Qt =
1 + g − β
γ
[−Xt +
∞∑
τ=0
v∗t+τ/(1 + g)
τ+1]
St = (1 + g − β)[Xt −
∞∑
τ=0
v∗t+τ/(1 + g)
τ+1] + uyt − γumt
Xt+1 = βXt + (1 + g − β)
∞∑
τ=0
v∗t+τ/(1 + g)
τ+1 − uyt + γumt
where v∗t+τ = u
y∗
t+τ − γum∗t+τ −
γβu∗t+τ
1 + g − β
The counterpart of equations (2.22)-(2.24) in Rosen (1987) is summarized as:
Qt =
1 + g − β
γ
[−Xt + u
y
t
1 + g − ρy −
γumt
1 + g − ρm ]−
βuht
1 + g − ρh
St = (1 + g − β)Xt + (β − ρy)
1 + g − ρy u
y
t − γ
(β − ρm)
1 + g − ρmu
m
t +
βγ
1 + g − ρhu
h
t
Xt+1 = βXt − β − ρy
1 + g − ρy u
y
t + γ
β − ρm
1 + g − ρmu
m
t −
βγ
1 + g − ρhu
h
t
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